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Introduction: The Glitch in the Federal Rulemaking Process
The fifteenth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("the
Federal Rules" or "the Rules"), which became effective on June 1,
1975, passed unnoticed well over a year ago. By most accounts, the
Rules have been a great success. Nevertheless, a profusion of schol-
arly articles have questioned the clarity, consistency, efficacy, and
wisdom of a host of evidence rules.' At least three comprehensive
1. See, e.g., Freda F. Bein, Parties' Admissions, Agents' Admissions: Hearsay Wolves in
Sheep's Clothing, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393 (1984); Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of
Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255 (1984);
Ronald L. Carlson & Steven M. Sumberg, Attacking Juy Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revi-
sion, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247; Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The
Residual Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and GrandJury Testimony, 36
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oversight initiatives (two ongoing) have surveyed the entire corpus
of the Rules, noted problems, and recommended changes. 2 In addi-
tion, circuit splits have emerged on important evidence issues. 3
Despite the scholarly activity, professional criticism, and divisions
among the circuits, there have been only six substantive amend-
ments to the Rules since their original passage in 1975, and three of
these resulted from legislation that was initiated by Congress and
not by any rules committee. 4 By contrast, during the same seven-
teen-year period, over one hundred substantive amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been made via the conven-
tional rulemaking process.5
This rough comparison is not, of course, an accurate caliper for
measuring the need for revision of the Federal Rules, but it raises
serious questions. The relative inactivity in proposing needed
amendments to the Rules stems in large part from an institutional
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431 (1986); Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things:
Deriding Disputed Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1988); Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of
the Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a
New Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231; David E. Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Few Surprises, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 453 (1984); Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony
Hearsay Exception: A Study in Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67
N.C. L. REV. 295 (1989).
2. The Williamsburg Conference, convened by the Federal Judicial Center and
chaired by United States District Judge, and former Professor, Charles Joiner, issued a
report on the Rules in May 1981. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE CONFERENCE (1981) [hereinafter FJC, REPORT] (copy on file with The
George Washington Law Review). Two separate committees of the American Bar Associa-
tion ("ABA") have conducted extensive reviews of the Rules. In 1983, the ABA Section
of Litigation issued Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a 324-page, rule-
by-rule analysis containing extensive criticisms. A second edition was published in
1991. See SECTION OF LrrsG., AM. BAR ASS'N, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter EMERGING PROBLEMS]. The Criminal Jus-
tice Section has conducted an ongoing review project. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION,
AM. BAR ASS'N, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: A FRESH REVIEW AND EVALUATION
(1987), reprinted in 120 F.R.D. 299 (1987) [hereinafter A FRESH REVIEW]. An initial ver-
sion of this report was chaired by Professor Paul Rothstein. A more recent report, to be
issued in 1992, was chaired by Professor Myrna Raeder.
3. See infra part V.A.
4. Congress, through legislative action, has amended Rule 410, Inadmissibility of
Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements, see Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-149, § 1(9), 89 Stat. 805, 805; has added Rule 412, Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of
Victim's Past Behavior, see Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-540, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046, 2046-47; and has amended Rule 704(b), Opinion on Ulti-
mate Issue, see Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 406, 98 Stat. 1837, 2067-68.
Three amendments are a product of the rulemaking process. The Supreme Court, act-
ing on the recommendation of the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, has amended Rule 410, see 441 U.S. 987, 992 (1979); Rule 609,
Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, see 480 U.S. 1025, 1030 (1987); and
Rule 404(b), Other Crimes, see id. at 1028. The Rules process has also produced a
number of purely technical amendments, primarily neutralizing gender.
5. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 290-92 (1989) (describing the rapid increase in amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since the mid-1970s).
1992] 859
glitch in the federal rulemaking process-the absence of an Advi-
sory Committee on the Rules of Evidence. The Standing Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States ("Standing Committee") is the administrative
body that generates proposed rule changes. 6 The Standing Com-
mittee relies upon the separate Advisory Committees for Civil,
Criminal, Appellate, and Bankruptcy Rules to assist in monitoring
the various rules and proposing changes. No Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules exists.
The institutional history explaining the absence of an advisory
committee is disconcerting. In 1981, the Federal Judicial Center
("FJC") convened the Williamsburg Conference to evaluate the
Rules, which had been in effect for just over five years. The FJC
Report resulting from the Williamsburg Conference recommended
the establishment of an Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence that would operate on the model of the Civil and Criminal
Rules Advisory Committees. 7 In its September 1981 Report to the
Judicial Conference, the Standing Committee, animated by the FJC
Report, recommended that the Chief Justice reconstitute an Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 Although the
Judicial Conference approved the recommendation, the Chief Jus-
tice, for reasons we do not know, never appointed a Committee.
Two years later, Congress sought to amend the Rules Enabling
Act to create an Advisory Committee on Evidence analogous to the
other advisory committees, but this amendment did not become
law. 9 Then, in September 1985, the Standing Committee reported
that "the reactivation of the Committee [on Evidence Rules] at this
time may not be desirable."' 0 Instead, the Committee formed an ad
hoc group consisting of members of the Civil and Criminal Rules
Advisory Committees "to review the Evidence Rules and make pro-
posals to the Standing Committee for any needed changes."" For
reasons that remain unclear, the ad hoc committee never met. Be-
tween 1985 and 1990, primary responsibility for the Federal Rules
6. The Standing Committee is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2073. It is composed of
trial and appellate judges, lawyers, and academics appointed by the ChiefJustice. Inter-
estingly, the statute provides that "[t]he judicial Conference shall authorize the appoint-
ment of a standing committee on rules of practice, procedure, and evidence under
subsection (a) of this section." 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988) (emphasis added). For some
unexplained reason, the word "evidence" does not appear in the title of the Standing
Committee.
7. See FJC, REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-7.
8. In its report, the Standing Committee wrote that "the time has now arrived to
reactivate an Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence to review the forth-
coming report on the Williamsburg Conference and to consider various proposals for
rules changes recommended in legal literature." STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 (1981).
9. H.R. 4144, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (proposing an amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2073(b)(1)).
10. STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ON THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4 (1985).
11. Id.
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was assigned to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, and the
Civil Rules Committee served a secondary role. Since October
1990, responsibility for the Rules has been loosely and informally
divided between the Advisory Committees on Civil and Criminal
Rules. Both bodies have authority to propose changes in the Fed-
eral Rules, and occasionally have done so.12
The current arrangement is inherently unsatisfactory. First, the
workload of the separate Criminal and Civil Rules Committees is
too heavy to accommodate the added responsibility of monitoring
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Given the nature and scope of the
work ahead, only an independent Advisory Committee on the Rules
of Evidence, with no duties other than the responsibility of review-
ing seventeen years of legal development, can adequately perform
the task.' 3 Indeed, without a special Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence, the Judicial Conference arguably may violate its
statutory mandate to "carry on a continuous study of the operation
and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or
hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other
courts of the United States pursuant to law."' 4
Second, the present informal division of responsibility for the
Federal Rules between the Civil and Criminal Rules Committees will
result in incomplete oversight and will create unnecessary tensions
and confusion. For example, the Civil Rules Committee recently
proposed an amendment to Rule 702 governing expert testimony.' 5
The interest of the Civil Rules Committee is obvious-most
problems with expert testimony arise in civil cases. 16 Expert testi-
mony, however, is not only a civil trial problem. Some of the most
important issues concerning expert testimony, such as the admissi-
bility of DNA typing, voiceprints, and polygraphs, arise in criminal
cases. The Civil Rules Committee proposals may not focus suffi-
ciently upon the specialized needs of the prosecution or of criminal
defendants. We note that the Criminal Rules Committee disap-
proved the Civil Rules Committee's initial Rule 702 proposal, but
the Standing Committee nevertheless modified and submitted it for
12. For example, the recent amendment to Rule 404(b), see supra note 4, was pro-
posed by the Criminal Rules Committee. The current proposal to amend Rule 702, see
infra text accompanying notes 120-24, has been advanced by the Civil Rules Committee.
13. See infra Conclusion (describing why we believe an Advisory Committee is the
correct mechanism).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 120-24.
16. See, e.g., Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the difficulty of deciding when expert testimony is admissible under the
Rules); Specht v.Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1008 (1989).
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public comment. 17
Third, the ad hoc division between the Civil and Criminal Advi-
sory Committees presents administrative problems. For example, a
Civil Rules Committee amendment, issued for public comment, may
not attract sufficient timely attention of those concerned with crimi-
nal cases because the proposed rule ostensibly deals only with civil
cases.
In short, the absence of an Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence to parallel the functions of the other advisory committees
has resulted in a lack of much needed oversight over the Rules and
explains the paucity of amendments, despite a demonstrated need.
This Article argues for the appointment of such a committee, identi-
fies problems in the current Rules as proof that such oversight is
needed, and suggests where such a committee might start. The
source of this proposal is not a preference for bureaucratic formal-
ism, but rather our judgment, shared by many judges, law profes-
sors, and practitioners, that review and selective revision of these
excellent rules are overdue.
The first task for an Advisory Committee should be a broad-based
review of the Rules. In conducting the review, the Committee
should consider the seventeen years of scholarship, federal jurispru-
dence, and activity within the state judicial systems energized by the
promulgation of the Rules.' 8 Proposals for selective revision of the
Rules should follow. In addition, an Advisory Committee should
serve as a forum for debates about evidence, and for collecting and
responding to case law and scholarship on evidence. Finally, it
should update the Advisory Committee notes and perhaps offer gui-
dance in the form of a manual on evidence. 19
In Part I of this Article, we review how the Supreme Court ap-
proaches and interprets the Federal Rules. This Part examines the
influence of plain meaning on evidence jurisprudence. The discus-
sion supports our argument for an Advisory Committee because
such a committee would monitor "plain meaning," respond to the
17. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and the Fed. Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 156 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary
Draft]. Another example of the Civil Rules Committee's narrow focus that can affect the
Rules of Evidence concerns the proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(a)(3)(C) that currently provides that most objections to exhibits are waived if
not made before trial. The proposed amendment would severely limit trial objections to
exhibits, and therefore alter evidence practice radically. We believe that the Civil Rules
Committee did not fully consider the ramifications of the proposed amendment to the
Federal Rules of Evidence on criminal practice. See infra note 288.
18. Thirty-four states, Puerto Rico, and the military courts have adopted their own
rules modeled after the Federal Rules. See 5JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND STATE COURTS (Supp. 1991) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN & BERGER]. See gener-
ally GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL
RULES IN THE STATES (1987 & Supp. 1990) (detailing each state's adoption and modifica-
tions to the Federal Rules of Evidence). A number of states have modified the federal
provisions. These modifications may be superior to the Federal Rules because some of
the changes doubtless reflect proposed solutions to identified problems in the drafting
or implementation of the Federal Rules.
19. See infra Conclusion (discussing the task for an Advisory Committee).
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Court's interpretations, and engage in evidence reform. In the sub-
sequent Parts of this Article, we discuss three areas of evidence law
that demand immediate attention, all of which share the common
thread of posing significant questions that have remained unan-
swered by the Rules.
Part II reviews the Supreme Court opinion in Bourjaily v. United
States, 20 which held, contrary to the general judicial consensus, that
courts could rely upon a coconspirator's statement itself in deter-
mining whether the preliminary showing of conspiracy was met.
Boujaily presents a serious problem in the interpretation of the
Rules of Evidence and demonstrates the potential mischief that can
result from a rigid plain meaning analysis of the Rules. Bourjaily also
raises interesting questions about how the common law rules that
preceded the Federal Rules should be utilized by the courts in inter-
preting the codified Rules.
Part III addresses the most controversial and important un-
resolved question in the Federal Rules-the standard for admitting
novel scientific testimony. Before the adoption of the Federal
Rules, many jurisdictions applied the Frye test of "general accept-
ance" for scientific testimony. The Rules and the advisory commit-
tee note 2 are silent on Frye. The circuits are split on its viability.
As in Bourjaily, the Rules' silence has caused confusion, particularly
in light of the preexisting common law jurisprudence. We believe
that Frye is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Rules, but
that it must be addressed nevertheless by a new Advisory Commit-
tee. We also comment upon the currently circulating proposal to
amend Rule 702 on expert testimony. Although we disagree with
the major thrust of the proposal, we welcome the dialogue the pro-
posed amendment has initiated.
In Part IV, we discuss the interrelationship between the Senten-
cing Reform Act and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on the one
hand, and the Federal Rules, on the other. We argue that the Rules
are incompatible with changes in the substantive law of sentencing.
Exempting sentencing hearings from evidentiary strictures was in-
nocuous in 1975, when the Federal Rules were passed, but this ex-
emption has caused great unfairness under the Sentencing Reform
Act. We propose extending the protections of the evidentiary rules
against unreliable evidence to sentencing. In addition, such
changes in the substantive law underscore the need for an ongoing
Advisory Committee to accommodate legal developments.
In Part V, we present a catalogue and summary of numerous
other problems that have emerged in the Federal Rules. This brief
20. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 702 and advisory committee's note.
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and necessarily incomplete review of circuit splits, gaps and incon-
sistencies in the Rules, debates over fundamental policy, and inno-
vative suggestions provides further evidence that a Committee is
needed, and that selective revision of the Federal Rules is in order.
In the Conclusion, we review the need for ongoing supervision and
argue that an Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee is the
best mechanism to achieve this end.
I. Evidence Jurisprudence and the "Plain Meaning" Syndrome
Recently, scholars have discussed the trend in the Supreme
Court's evidence decisions toward a "plain meaning" 22 interpreta-
tion of the Federal Rules. 23 For example, in Bourjaily v. United
States, 2 4 which we discuss in detail in Part II of this Article, the Court
relied heavily upon a plain meaning interpretation of Rules 104 and
801(d)(2)(E) in holding that a trial judge may consider the contested
coconspirator statement itself in establishing the threshold require-
ment for the existence of a conspiracy. 25 The Court dissected the
language of the Rules, and noted that the common law requirement
of independent evidence of conspiracy was not codified in the Fed-
eral Rules. The Court discounted the common law tradition that
22. Plain meaning interpretation requires that where the words of the statute are
clear, the "plain meaning" of those words control. In interpreting the Federal Rules,
the Supreme Court has adopted a modified "new plain meaning," or textualism, inter-
pretation-an approach that affords plain language preeminence, but does not necessar-
ily forbid inquiry into legislative history. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 82 (5th ed. 1992) (noting that plain meaning is a
primary but not exclusive justification that courts use in explaining their reasoning).
Plain meaning is part of a larger trend in the Supreme Court's approach to statutory
interpretation, of which Justice Scalia is the most vocal proponent. See, e.g., INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the lan-
guage of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative
intent.").
23. Professor Imwinkelried has argued in a series of articles that the Federal Rules
have become a self-contained civil law code. He complains that, under the aegis of the
Rules, the judge has lost common law power to fashion exclusionary rules of evidence,
and that logically relevant evidence is admissible even when the judge legitimately
doubts the reliability of its source or when exclusion serves public policy. See Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LrrG. 129
(1987); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prjudice in Federal Rule
of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 879 (1988); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465(1985); see also PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL: STATE AND FEDERAL RULES
5, 24-26 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter ROTHSTEIN, NUTSHELL] (arguing that the common
law power to exclude expert testimony does not survive the Federal Rules); Berger, supra
note 1, at 255 (arguing that the common law of the admissibility of evidence is replaced
by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
Professor Jonakait has extended the argument. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx. L. REV. 745 (1990)
(discussing recent Supreme Court evidence decisions and arguing that, in contravention
of the history and source of the Rules, the Supreme Court has adhered to a plain mean-
ing of the Rules' text).
24. 483 U.S. 171 (1987); see alsoJonakait, supra note 23, at 749-52. For a discussion
of Bou jaily, see infra part II.
25. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181.
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had required independent corroboration of the existence of a con-
spiracy before admitting a coconspirator's statement as an admis-
sion of the accused. 26
Similarly, in Huddleston v. United States,27 the Supreme Court relied
upon plain meaning to hold that evidence of "other crimes, wrongs
or acts" under Rule 404(b) 28 is admissible if the jury could reason-
ably conclude that the "other act" occurred.29 The hallmark of the
Court's analysis was its observation, based upon plain meaning, that
nowhere do the Rules require a judicial screening of the other act
evidence.30 In addition to the plain meaning approach, the Court
cited the "structure of the Rules of Evidence"3 1 and the legislative
history, noting that petitioner's contentions were "simply inconsis-
tent" with the Advisory Committee Notes as well as the House and
Senate Reports.3 2
In United States v. Owens, 33 the Court again approached the Federal
Rules by first addressing plain meaning. In Owens, the Court held
that an out-of-court identification of the defendant by a witness was
admissible under Rule 801 (d)(1)(C),34 where the declarant could re-
member making the identification but could not recall the underly-
ing incident.35 In holding that the identification met the strictures
of Rule 801, the Court began by analyzing the Rule's requirement
that the identifying witness be "subject to cross examination con-
cerning the statement." It then applied "the more natural reading"
26. Id. at 179-82.
27. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
28. Rule 404(b), as amended, provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal
case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added to language recently added).
29. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
30. ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote that "[t]he text contains no intimation, however,
that any preliminary showing is necessary" and criticized petitioner's reading because it
"superimposes a level ofjudicial oversight that is nowhere apparent from the language
of that provision." Id. at 687-88.
31. Id. at 687.
32. Id. at 688.
33. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
34. Rule 801(d)(1)(C) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person."
FED. R. EvD. 801(d)(1)(C).
35. Owens, 484 U.S. at 564. The witness, a prison guard, had received such serious
head injuries that he was unable to remember the events of the assault. In a lucid mo-
ment, the guard had identified Owens as the perpetrator. At trial, he could not remem-
ber the underlying incident, but he did recall making the identification. Id. at 556.
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to argue that because the witness was present and available to an-
swer questions, he was subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement.a
6
Despite the Court's rhetoric and its affinity for plain meaning, it
has not adopted a monolithic approach, and continues to rely also
upon legislative history, structure, and the overall policies of the
Rules. The Court has recognized that plain meaning is not a useful
method for dissecting every evidence problem. Some evidence
questions simply lie outside the Rules. For example, in United States
v. Abel, 3 7 after quoting with approval the statement that "[i]n princi-
ple, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence re-
mains,"38 the Court analyzed and applied a principle of evidence-
impeachment for bias-that is not delineated in the Rules.
Furthermore, codification does not assure susceptibility to plain
meaning. For example, in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 3 9 plain mean-
ing analysis was not helpful where the issue concerned the definition
of the purposely vague and flexible term, "factual finding," under
Rule 803(8). The Court attempted a plain meaning interpretation
but admitted its uselessness.40
Finally, the Court specifically has rejected a plain meaning ap-
proach when it leads to absurd results. For example, Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co.41 required the Court to interpret Rule 609,
which admits evidence of former convictions "only if" the proba-
tiveness of the evidence exceeds its prejudice "to the defendant." 42
The Court refused to read Rule 609 literally in civil cases, noting
that favoring a civil defendant over a civil plaintiff is illogical and
arguably unconstitutional. 43 Although the Court split on how much
36. Id. at 561-62. The Court compared the Rule 801(d)(1)(C) standard, which re-
quires only cross-examination "concerning the statement," with Rule 804(a)(3), which
defines unavailability. Id. at 562. Rule 804 defines unavailability, in part, as where the
declarant cannot remember "the subject matter of the declarant's statement." FED. R.
EVID. 804(a)(1). The Court relied upon the structural argument that Congress, in ap-
proving the language of Rule 801, could have required, as it did in Rule 804, a witness
to possess memory of the underlying event. The Court mentioned legislative history,
but only briefly, commenting on Congress' rationale for the identification exception,
which stressed that prior identifications are more reliable than subsequent ones. Owens,
484 U.S. at 562.
37. 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (allowing the prosecutor to use extrinsic evidence to im-
peach a defense witness for bias).
38. Id. at 51 (quoting Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evi-
dence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978)).
39. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
40. Id. at 163-64. The legislative history also was enigmatic, Id. at 164-68, and the
Court decided the case based upon policy grounds and the structure of the Rules. Id. at
168-70.
41. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
42. FED. R. EvID. 609.
43. Green, 490 U.S. at 509-10.
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legislative history to consult,4 4 and how to rectify this obvious draft-
ing error,4 5 it was unanimous in rejecting the plain language that
would have led to an absurd result.46
Significant scholarly attention has been devoted to theories of
statutory interpretation, particularly in light of the Court's recent
trend toward plain meaning.47 In particular, there is a growing rec-
ognition that generalized, global theories of statutory interpretation
are less helpful than approaches tailored to individual statutes.48
The Federal Rules present a fascinating, if peculiar, case study for
plain meaning.
The Rules govern an area of judicial activity where judges have
firm opinions, strong interest, and perhaps some unique wisdom.49
The Rules are generally clear and well-written. Thus, a plain mean-
ing approach does not trigger noticeable angst about our ability to
understand and agree upon meaning. Many of the Rules, however,
although "clear" and "plain," are purposely flexible. For example,
44. Justice Scalia concurred separately, arguing that the majority's lengthy discus-
sion of legislative history was excessive and might mislead future litigants into believing
that such detailed and obscure history would constitute persuasive authority. Id. at 529-
30 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. Three dissenters, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, argued that in-
stead of limiting the balancing test to criminal defendants, the Court instead should
extend it to all civil litigants, defendants, and plaintiffs alike. Id. at 530-33.
46. Rule 609 is one of the few Rules of Evidence that has been changed since the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. See 480 U.S. 1025, 1030 (1987).
The sensible changes in Rule 609 result in part from the Court's criticism of the irration-
ality of the old version.
47. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY ch. 7 (1988) (re-
viewing recent opinions where the Court used the plain meaning approach to decide the
case and discussingJustice Scalia's theory that the use of legislative history to determine
legislative intent is inherently unreliable).
48. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987) (arguing that statutes, like the Constitution, should be interpreted in
their present societal, political, and legal contexts); Michael Livingston, Congress, the
Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV.
819 (1991) (arguing for a refinement of theories of interpretation to reflect the unique
nature of the tax legislative process); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Read-
ing of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982) (arguing for an econom-
ics-based interpretation to legislation); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (arguing for the development of a new set
of interpretive norms for interpreting statutes).
49. There is no reason that more deference should be paid to the plain meaning of
the Federal Rules than the other rules of procedure because Congress affirmatively en-
acted the Federal Rules. But cf. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FED-
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 12 (5th
ed. 1990) (arguing that Congress' affirmative enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence may impede the growth and development of evidence law). The judiciary is a
coequal branch of government with the special obligation for the administration ofjus-
tice. Furthermore, one justification for plain meaning-that it is a way of preventing
judicial overreaching-seems less compelling in the context of rules governing the con-
duct of a judicial trial.
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whether information will "assist" 50 or "confuse"5 1 the trier of fact is
a quintessential judicial judgment call. Where Congress purposely
left a point open or vague, attempts to justify various interpretations
by resort to plain meaning are disingenuous.
The relationship between the Rules and the vast body of common
law that they codify and incorporate is complex. Unquestionably,
the Rules coexist with unstated common law assumptions that were
never formally incorporated into the corpus of the Rules. The spe-
cial relationship of the Federal Rules to the common law and the
special expertise of the bench in evidentiary matters affect how the
Rules should be interpreted.
Many of the so-called plain meaning debates pose questions of
how to resolve discrepancies between the plain text of the Federal
Rules and the generally shared interpretation of the Rules deriving
from preexisting common law traditions. 52 Under the new theory of
plain meaning, the language of the Federal Rules controls, even in
light of a strong and persuasive common law tradition to the con-
trary. Obviously, where the Rules consciously and clearly depart
from preexisting common law, that departure supplants the pre-
Rules approach. Plain meaning is troubling, however, when there is
no indication that Congress intended to deviate from the prior com-
mon law consensus, yet courts still use such "plain" interpretations
to overrule the underlying common law that at least informed, and
perhaps determined, congressional understanding and expectation.
Whatever the merits of plain meaning, however, it has arrived as a
theory of choice in interpreting the Federal Rules. It is therefore
vital that a group convened to consider revision of the Rules should
be free to reframe the Rules consistent with the original intent of
the drafters. If the drafters failed to draft with sufficient clarity the
first time (or if the Supreme Court misread the text), the drafters
can produce a better second effort. So viewed, the jurisprudence of
plain meaning should act not as a deterrent, but as a spur to a Rules
revision process. Moreover, the Court's affinity for plain meaning
emphasizes the need to monitor the Rules so that they say what they
mean. Because of the current trend in interpretation, an Advisory
Committee will perform an essential service by making words more
specific and clarifying what is intended. All of these factors support
the creation of an Advisory Committee on Evidence.
50. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
51. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
52. Two examples of these debates are discussed in this Article. See infra part II
(discussing the proper relationship between the common law and the Rules on cocon-
spirator declarations); infra part III (discussing the proper relationship between the
common law and the Rules on the admissibility of scientific testimony).
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II. Rules 104 and 801(d)(2)(E)-The Trouble with Bourjaily
In Bourjaily v. United States,53 the Court considered the founda-
tional requirements for the admissibility of coconspirator declara-
tions under the Federal Rules. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) exempts from
hearsay "a statement [made] by a coconspirator of a party during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 54 As a founda-
tional matter, to apply the exemption, a court must determine that a
conspiracy existed and that the declarant and the defendant were
both a part of it.55
Reliance upon the actual statement to prove the foundational re-
quirement was labelled derisively "bootstrapping" by the common
law. Instead, the common law required that the judge, to make the
foundational finding of a conspiracy, use evidence entirely in-
dependent of the coconspirator declaration sought to be admitted.56
The common law requirement of independent evidence of a con-
spiracy does not appear, however, in Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Both the
text of Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) and the accompanying advisory committee
notes are silent on the independence element. Bourjaily departed
53. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
54. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
55. Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 175. We do not distinguish between civil and criminal
cases. Although most conspiracy cases arise in a criminal context, Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
encompasses both, and arises most notably in civil Racketeering, Influenced, and Cor-
rupt Organization ("RICO") cases. Because of the close nexus between criminal law
and civil RICO, strong policy arguments exist for applying the same standard in RICO
cases. Moreover, applying a different standard in civil and criminal cases seems unduly
complicated.
56. Such evidence is usually referred to as "evidence aliunde." In Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), both of
which pre-date the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court set out the evidence aliunde re-
quirement. In Glasser, a defendant claimed that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to adequate assistance of counsel where his attorney also represented another de-
fendant in the case. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 67. Glasser contended that his attorney had
failed to object to a statement implicating him because the statement was made by his
attorney's other client in the case. Id. at 68-69. The prosecution argued that the state-
ment nevertheless would have been admissible as a coconspirator declaration. Id. at 74.
The Court dismissed the possibility that the statement constituted a coconspirator's ad-
mission. Id. at 73-75. The Court noted that "such declarations are admissible over the
objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not present when they were made, only if
there is proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. Otherwise, hearsay would
lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." Id. at 74-75 (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, in setting out the standard of cocon-
spirator's admissions in Nixon, the Court included the requirement that such
declarations are admissible "upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a
conspiracy among one or more other defendants." Nixon, 418 U.S. at 701 (footnote
omitted). Virtually all of the courts of appeals had adopted this "independence" re-
quirement and adhered to it even after the Federal Rules were adopted. See, e.g.,
Boudaily, 483 U.S. at 195 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing how the Courts of
Appeals have treated this issue); see also Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator
Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV. 323, 371 (1984) (arguing,
pre-Bouaily, that the independence requirement survived the enactment of the Federal
Rules).
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from the common law prohibition on bootstrapping and held that a
judge need not rely entirely upon independent evidence of conspir-
acy, but may consider the coconspirator statement itself in deter-
mining whether a conspiracy existed.57 It left open, however, the
question of whether coconspirator statements may serve as the only
evidence of the preliminary fact of conspiracy. In contesting his
conviction, 58 Bourjaily challenged the admission of statements
made by Angelo Lonardo and introduced by the government
against Bouraily as coconspirator declarations. In a tape-recorded
telephone conversation, Lonardo told an FBI informant that he had
a "gentleman friend" who wished to purchase cocaine. Lonardo ar-
ranged to meet the informant at a deserted hotel parking lot, where
Lonardo stated that his "friend" would be waiting to complete the
transaction. Lonardo removed the cocaine from the informant's car
and carried it to the car where Bourjaily had been waiting. At that
point, the FBI interceded and arrested Lonardo and Bouraily, find-
ing nearly $20,000 in cash in Bourjaily's car.5 9
Bourjaily claimed that statements by Lonardo concerning a "gen-
tleman friend" were inadmissible as coconspirator admissions be-
cause there was insufficient proof of conspiracy and because the
district court had relied upon the statement itself in determining
whether a conspiracy existed. 60 Bourjaily urged the Court to hold
that the common law prohibition survived because the Federal
Rules "evidenced no intent to disturb the bootstrapping rule."'61
He argued that the common law rule prohibiting bootstrapping was
so well-settled that it should survive the adoption of the Federal
Rules absent "affirmative evidence" indicating Congress' intent to
abolish the rule. 62
The Supreme Court majority rejected Bouraily's argument. Re-
lying primarily upon the text of the Federal Rules themselves, the
majority noted that Rule 801(d) (2) (E) imposed no requirement of
independent proof of conspiracy. 63 Instead, the Court turned to
57. BourJaily, 483 U.S. at 178-79.
58. Bourjaily was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio for conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Bourjaily appealed his convictions, United
States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1986), and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, 479 U.S. 881 (1986).
59. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 173-74.
60. Id. at 176. Furthermore, Bouraily argued that his Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion rights were violated by the admission of Lonardo's statements against him when
Lonardo was unavailable for cross examination. Id. at 181-82. We discuss only the stat-
utory aspect of Bourjaily. We note, however, that courts traditionally considered only
independent evidence of the conspiracy. This traditional prohibition on bootstrapping,
which Bouijaily eliminated, belies the majority's argument that the coconspirator exemp-
tion (as construed by the Court) is a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. at 183.
Therefore, although we do not address the constitutional result, which depends upon
the "firmly rooted" rhetoric, we note that if Bourlaily had been decided the way we sug-
gest-requiring independent evidence of a conspiracy-the constitutional question sim-
ply would not have been presented.
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 178-79.
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Rule 104, which controls preliminary determinations about evi-
dence. In examining Rule 104, the majority found no requirement
that a trial judge rely upon independent evidence to determine the
existence of a conspiracy. It interpreted Rule 104, which exempts
the court from employing the strictures of the Federal Rules in mak-
ing preliminary determinations, to require no independent proof of
conspiracy.6 4 The majority contended that its reading was consis-
tent with the plain meaning of the text and that such a plain mean-
ing "would seem to many to be the end of the matter."6 5
The majority also refuted Bourjaily's argument that, in this con-
text, Congress could not possibly have intended the sweeping abro-
gation of common law that its plain meaning approach to Rule 104
would effect.66 Without specifically addressing the place of legisla-
tive history, the majority simply dismissed the logic of Bourjaily's
argument, sharply rejecting the notion that legislative silence could
be imputed to support the proposition that Congress intended to
perpetuate the requirement of entirely independent evidence of
conspiracy. The majority observed that "[i]t would be extraordinary
to require legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of Rule
104."67 Finally, the majority discussed the policy underlying the
coconspirator declaration rule, and argued that it would be fair to
use the declaration itself to prove the threshold fact of the existence
of the conspiracy. 68 It stressed that such statements are merely "pre-
sumed unreliable" 69 and may, when joined with other evidence, paint
64. Id. at 178. Rule 104 provides in part: "In making its determination [the court] is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." FED. R.
EvID. 104(a).
65. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 178. The majority, however, did not rest its reasoning on
the plain meaning of Rule 104 alone, although its rhetoric implies that it could have. It
reviewed the common law that had developed requiring independent proof of conspir-
acy, but then dismissed these cases because they were pre-Rules decisions. Id. at 177-
78. By doing so, the majority emphasized its plain meaning approach, portraying the
Rules as an entirely new body of law, about which traditional common law could not
meaningfully instruct. The majority also examined the policy behind coconspirator ad-
missions.
The dissent makes the important point that the majority's plain meaning is not the
only logical interpretation of the Rules, particularly when Rules 801(d)(2)(E) and 104
are read together. Id. at 194-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Another valid interpreta-
tion, and one that comports with the history of the Rule, see infra note 80 and accompa-
nying text, would accommodate the liberal Rule 104 standard of permitting thejudge to
rely upon inadmissible evidence in making preliminary determinations about the tradi-
tional requirement of independent proof of conspiracy. It would frame the inquiry in
terms of the common law requirement of independence. Thus, the judge could use all
evidence, except privileged evidence, to determine whether there existed independent
proof of conspiracy. Bourlaily, 483 U.S. at 195 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See Mueller, supra
note 56, at 372 (distinguishing the manner of proof, governed by Rule 104, and the
point to be proved, independent existence of conspiracy).
66. Boudaily, 483 U.S. at 178.
67. Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 179-80.
69. Id. at 179 (emphasis in original). The court noted that "a piece of evidence,
1992]
a convincing picture of conspiracy. 70
We believe that Bourjaily reaches a fundamentally incorrect result.
The Supreme Court majority fails to confront the underlying ration-
ale and history of the admission of coconspirator's statements and
thereby undervalues the importance of independent proof of
conspiracy. 7'
The most frequently articulated rationale for admitting cocon-
spirator statements is the agency theory72-that coconspirators have
made a "partnership in crime." 73 Abandonment of the indepen-
dence requirement, however, vitiates the agency justification. As a
general matter, agency law requires independent proof of the
agency relationship; hence, the traditional prohibition that an
agent's statement alone cannot serve as proof of agency.7 4 By anal-
ogy, the coconspirators' "partnership in crime" must also be proven
by independent evidence.
Furthermore, it is difficult to justify admission of coconspirator
declarations on the basis of trustworthiness. 75 As the admissions
become more removed from the party-opponent himself, the state-
ments seem less reliable.76 Particularly in the case of coconspira-
tors, such statements are suspect because participants in a criminal
unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when corroborated by other evi-
dence. A per se rule barring consideration of these hearsay statements during prelimi-
nary factfinding is not therefore required." Id. at 180.
70. The reliability factor would be undercut, however, if the coconspirator state-
ment is the only evidence of conspiracy. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of the rationale of the rule, see RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STE-
PHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS
AND CASES 394-98 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter LEMPERT & SALTZBURG] (discussing various
theories forjustifying coconspirator admissions); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18,
801(d) (2) (E) [01] (same); PatrickJ. Sullivan, Note, Bootstrapping of Hearsay Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E): Further Erosion of the Coconspirator Exemption, 74 IowA L. REV.
467, 474-78 (1989) (discussing the rationale for the exemption).
72. McCormick on Evidence introduces its section on coconspirators by observing:
"Analogous to partnerships are conspiracies to commit a crime or an unlawful or tor-
tious act." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 267, at 792 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK]. Not everyone agrees, however, that the agency theory makes
sense. The committee note to Rule 801(d)(2) labels it a fiction. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)
advisory committee's note. Weinstein's Evidence explains that the drafters adhered to the
agency rationale for coconspirator declarations "not because they found it a convincing
rationale but because they adjudged it a useful device for protecting defendants from
the very real dangers of unfairness posed by conspiracy prosecutions." 4 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 18, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-310.
73. Judge Learned Hand explained: "When men enter into an agreement for an
unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, and have made a 'partnership
in crime.' What one does pursuant to their common purpose, all do, and, as declara-
tions may be such acts, they are competent against all." Van Riper v. United States, 13
F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 285 (1957).
75. Often admissions are justified "on the theory that their admissibility in evidence
is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the
hearsay rule." FED. R. EVID. 801(b)(2)(E) advisory committee's note. This justification,
even when accounting for agency theories, only makes sense in the context of personal,
authorized, or adopted admissions. FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(A) to (C). See Mueller, supra
note 56, at 355.
76. Coconspirator declarations are the last of a series of admissions in the hearsay
exemption that evolve from personal to vicarious admissions, beginning with the admis-
sion of the party himself and ending with an admission of a coconspirator. See FED. R.
EvID. 801(d)(2).
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endeavor have the incentive to blame or involve others. 77 The trust-
worthiness, if any, of coconspirators' statements derives from the
special knowledge that the conspiring criminals obtained in the
course of the conspiracy. 78 Such putative trustworthiness, however,
presumes the existence of a conspiracy, and thereby makes boot-
strapping appear particularly dangerous. As the Bouraily dissent ex-
plained, abandonment of the independence requirement "will
eliminate one of the few safeguards of reliability that this exemption
from the hearsay definition possesses. '79
Boujaily is flawed not only because it failed to confront the under-
lying rationale of the coconspirator exception, but also because it
failed to address the history and development of this exemption
from hearsay. Congress did not invent coconspirator admissions, it
only attempted to codify the preexisting rule. The Advisory Com-
mittee, uncertain about the wisdom of the agency principle, decided
to incorporate it into the rule without expanding it.8s The Federal
Rules retain all other aspects of the common law coconspirator dec-
laration requirements-duration and furtherance-except in-
dependent proof of agency. The silence likely stems from the
oversight in tailoring the very general provisions of Rule 104 to the
77. Conspirators are not noted for trustworthiness or dependability. See Joseph H.
Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1954) ("It is no victory for common sense to make a
belief that criminals are notorious for their veracity the basis for law."), quoted in United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 405 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mueller, supra note
56, at 355. The Court's emphasis on reliability, see Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 180 (1987) ("Tlhere is little doubt that a co-conspirator's statements could them-
selves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both the
defendant and the declarant."), stems in part from a confusion between statements that
would otherwise be hearsay, exempted from hearsay by Rule 801 (d)(2), and those oper-
ative facts or verbal acts that are not hearsay at all. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note
71, at 398-400.
78. The drafters of the Model Code of Evidence rejected the agency theory and
argued for an expansion of the coconspirator exemption based upon its reliability. The
comment to Rule 508(b) of the Model Code read: "IT]he tendency in the authorities is
to receive evidence of all declarations of a conspirator concerning the conspiracy when
made during its pendency. These statements are likely to be true, and are usually made
with a realization that they are against the declarant's interest." MODEL CODE OF EvI-
DENCE Rule 508(b), at 251 (1942), quoted in 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18,
801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-309 n.25.
79. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 186 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); see also 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL
& CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 427, at 332 (1980) [hereinafter Loui-
SELL & MUELLER] (stating that the "independent evidence requirement amounts to an
expression of mistrust in the use of such statements"); Mueller, supra note 56, at 373
("[The coconspirator exception is one which, in its very nature and for good reason,
calls out for corroborative proof.").
80. The Advisory Committee note explained that "the agency theory of conspiracy
is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already
established." FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note.
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specialized case of the coconspirator exception. Indeed, the argu-
ment that the Bourlaily majority rejects-that silence imputes the sta-
tus quo-probably best reflects congressional intent to perpetuate
the rule.
Abolishing the independence requirement strengthens the hand
of the prosecutor.81 It requires less of a showing of conspiracy than
was required under the common law. It may also assist in insulating
irrational trial court decisions on conspiracy from judicial review.8 2
In addition, although the majority in Bourjaily specifically avoided
the question, 83 the opinion leaves open the dangerous possibility
that the coconspirator statements could form the only evidence of
conspiracy.
The ultimate impact of Bourjaily is, however, unclear. First, it is
rare that the only available proof of conspiracy is the statement it-
self. Often there is additional circumstantial evidence.8 4 Second,
the trial judge still must pass on the reliability of the statement and
find the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Bourjaily does not require a finding of conspiracy or mandate
bootstrapping. It only rejected the common law majority rule that
would consider only independent proof of conspiracy8 5 and permit-
ted the trial judge to rely upon the coconspirator's statement it-
self.8 6 If the only evidence of the conspiracy is the coconspirator's
statement, we hope that ajudge would find that insufficient evidence
of a conspiracy existed to meet the threshold requirement.
We note that the courts of appeals, in interpreting Bourjaily, have
routinely relied upon and occasionally overtly required additional
independent evidence aside from the coconspirator's statement.8 7
81. See Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy: The Impact of Bourjaily on
Admissions by Coconspirator, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 48, 52 (1988) (arguing that Bourjaily's im-
pact will be substantial because it "will significantly ease the government's burden in
many of its more difficult cases").
82. See Mueller, supra note 56, at 373.
83. "We need not decide in this case whether the courts below could have relied
solely upon Lonardo's hearsay statements to determine that a conspiracy had been es-
tablished by a preponderance of the evidence." Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 181.
84. See Thomas J. Scorza, Problems with Co-Conspirator Hearsay, 16 LITIG. 30, 31 (1990)
(discussing the likelihood that other evidence of the conspiracy will exist).
85. Bourlaily, 483 U.S. at 178-79.
86. Bouraily states that "a court, in making a preliminary factual determination
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), may examine the hearsay statements sought to be admitted."
Id. at 181. The Court acknowledged that the ultimate decision is one for the trial judge
who "'should receive evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience
counsel.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1974)). See Brian
Burris & Gary Nelson, Note, Co-Conspirator Hearsay in Federal and Kansas Jurisdictions After
Bourjaily v. United States, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 528, 544 (1988) (noting that trial judges
may, in their discretion, rely totally upon independent evidence in making a finding as to
the admissibility of conspiracy statements).
87. See United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.5 (3d Cir.) (noting that
"every United States court of appeals that has addressed this issue has required some
independent evidence," and listing recent cases), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991);
United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that a statement
standing alone is insufficient without some independent evidence, otherwise all such
statements would be "self-validating" and would eliminate the safeguard of corrobora-
tion); see also 5 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79, § 427, at 168 (noting that "the Court
in Bourjaily expressly declined to hold that the statement alone could prove the necessary
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Even those courts that have not explicitly required some independ-
ent evidence have nevertheless, without exception, relied upon
other evidence in addition to the statement itself to find the exist-
ence of a conspiracy.88 To our knowledge, no court has allowed the
statement alone to serve as sufficient evidence of conspiracy; yet,
since Bourjaily, that possibility exists. Given the vast amount ofjudi-
cial discretion involved in making the preliminary determination
and the current trend toward harmless error, it is unlikely that a trial
court would be reversed on this point.
In addition to its controversial outcome, Bourjaily is important be-
cause of its reasoning. The dissent chides the majority for espous-
ing "an overly rigid interpretive approach"8 9 and eschewing "a
more complete analysis." 90 The dissent challenged the majority's
overarching view of the function of the Federal Rules and the major-
ity's willingness to cast away the common law tradition without first
investigating the complicated interrelationship of the Rules and the
presumptions of Congress. 91 By "accepting the easily available
safety 'net' of Rule 104(a)'s 'plain meaning,' "92 the majority failed
to wrestle with a truly difficult question of interpretation. In
Bourjaily, the Court demonstrated its willingness to adhere to its
own version of plain meaning and to ignore another interpretation
that comported with congressional intent to leave the coconspirator
exception intact. 93 Its preference for plain meaning outside any
consideration of the context in which the Rule was drafted may
predicate, and post-Bouraily cases suggest that some independent evidence is still re-
quired") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
18, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-311 (stating that "[s]ufficient proof is defined as hearsay
statements coupled with other independent evidence which corroborates the hearsay
statements") (citing Bourjaily); Burris & Nelson, supra note 86, at 544 (interpreting
Bourjaily to allow bootstrapping only where there is some independent evidence).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Chestang, 849 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating
that "[w]e need not decide whether the district court could have relied solely on the
coconspirator statements in making preliminary factual determinations under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). In addition to the coconspirator statements themselves, there was suffi-
cient independent evidence ... to support the district court's finding ... that the Ches-
tangs were involved in a conspiracy .... .") (footnote omitted); United States v.
Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1988) (admitting bootstrapped coconspirator's state-
ment to prove conspiracy in light of corroboration by other independent evidence); see
also John E. Sullivan, Note, Bourjaily v. United States: A New Rule for Admitting Cocon-
spirator Hearsay Statements Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 1988 Wis. L. REV.
577, 596 n.123 (reviewing recent United States Courts of Appeals decisions and noting
that "[i]n all these cases, some form of nonhearsay corroborating evidence was
presented to link the defendant to a conspiracy"); Patrick J. Sullivan, supra note 71, at
502 n.259 (discussing cases that have required independent evidence to buttress the
coconspirator's statement).
89. Boudaily, 483 U.S. at 187-88 (Blackmun,J. dissenting).
90. Id. at 188.
91. Id. at 186-96.
92. Id. at 195.
93. On the Court's plain meaning approach to interpreting the Federal Rules, see
supra part I.
1992] 875
seem less jarring in light of Congress' silence on the issue. The ma-
jority's rhetoric, however, insinuates that plain meaning will trump
congressional intent, provided the result is not absurd, even where
there is strong evidence in the legislative history that the "plain"
language plainly is not what Congress meant.
The Court's opinion in Bourjaily raises important issues for a
newly-created Advisory Committee to consider. First, such a Com-
mittee should consider the substantive issue of whether independ-
ent evidence of conspiracy is required for the admission of a
coconspirator's declaration. At the very least, it is clear that Con-
gress did not address this question. We suggest that the Rule be
amended. 94 Second, such a Committee should consider the under-
lying basis for the submission of coconspirator's statements, for
there seems to be little consensus on the rationale behind allowing
such admissions. Finally, on a more theoretical level, Bourjaily
presents a case study for interpreting the plain meaning of the Fed-
eral Rules. It raises the issue of how pre-Rules common law should
affect courts' interpretations of the Rules.
III. Rule 702-Scientific Evidence and Expert Opinion
Rule 702, which liberalized the common law's rules concerning
admission of expert opinion testimony, is among the most innova-
tive and controversial of the Federal Rules. 95 Rule 702 allows the
admission of any expert testimony that "will assist the trier of
fact." 96 Hence, it substitutes a "helpfulness" standard for the previ-
ous common law requirement that an expert may only testify where
the subject matter of the testimony otherwise would be incompre-
hensible to the lay factfinder.9 7 This revision of the common law
94. One possible solution has been advanced by the American Bar Association
Criminal Justice Section Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence,
which is in the process of proposing a redraft of the coconspirator declaration rule. The
Section's current proposal, (1) requires that the declarant be produced if available; (2)
requires that membership in the conspiracy and the trustworthiness of the statement be
corroborated by independent evidence; (3) applies a standard of clear and convincing
evidence in criminal cases and a preponderance standard in civil cases; and (4) requires
notice to the adverse party. We favor a return to the common law majority requirement
of proof aliunde. We believe that the prophylactic value of a rule barring all bootstrap-
ping preserves the trustworthiness and integrity of coconspirator admissions. The ABA
proposal, however, provides a reasonable alternative that will also protect the rights of
the alleged coconspirator and offers a starting point for reconsideration of the cocon-
spirator rule. See also Sullivan, supra note 71, at 503-04 (discussing alternatives that
would limit reliance upon bootstrapping).
95. See Paul Rothstein, New Approaches to Qualification of Experts in Courts, I CTs.
HEALTH SCI. & L. 450, 450-51 (1991) (delineating "Seven 'Great Liberalizations' of
Opinion and Expert Evidence"). The other major innovation in expert testimony is
Rule 703. See infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable reli-
ance standard of Rule 703).
96. Rule 702 reads: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
97. See 4 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79, § 380, at 633; 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 18, 702[02], at 702-09.
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has been successful generally, but includes the greatest single over-
sight in the Rules-failure to clarify the standard for admitting novel
scientific evidence.
Neither Rule 702 nor the Advisory Committee's note adopted a
position on the post-Rule 702 viability of Frye v. United States,98 the
landmark opinion on novel scientific evidence. In Frye, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a polygraph
test had not yet attained the requisite acceptance among experts in
the field to be admitted into evidence. 99 Frye held that, to be admis-
sible, such novel scientific evidence must satisfy a "general accept-
ance" standard. 100 Although Frye predates the Rules, the circuits
are sharply divided on its applicability, 101 as are the state courts.' 0 2
Shepard's Federal Citations lists over one thousand citations to Frye in
state and federal courts.'0 3 Concomitantly, scholarship on the Frye
issue is legion.'04
98. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
99. Id- at 1014 (stating that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs"). See generally LEmPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 71, at 861-62 (describing the
Frye standard); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (same).
100. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Although the Frye issue is often couched in terms of stan-
dards for the admission of novel scientific evidence, the analysis is the same when applied
to scientific evidence in general.
101. Compare Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 784 F.2d 545, 553-54 (4th Cir. 1986) (re-
jecting Frye) and United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (same)
and United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110
(5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam) (adopting the Frye standard), cert. denied, 60
U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1992) and United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 755-56
(7th Cir. 1981) (same) and United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 362-63 (6th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979) and United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161,
163 (8th Cir. 1975) (same) and United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (same).
102. Compare People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (endorsing the Frye
standard) and Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (same) and State v. Schwartz,
447 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1989) (same) and People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986
(Sup. Ct. 1989) (same) and Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 1977)
(same) with Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429,431 (Ark. 1991) (rejecting the Frye standard)
and Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Colo. 1991) (same) and Andrews v. State, 533
So. 2d 841, 846-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (same) and Rubanick v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 747-48 (N.J. 1991) (same).
103. SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CrrATONS (7th ed. 1989 & Supps.). See generally Giannelli,
supra note 99, at 1204-08 (discussing the widespread reliance upon and citation to Frye).
104. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 99; Michael H. Graham, Relevancy and the Exclusion
of Relevant Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of a Scientific Principle or Technique--Application of
the Frye Test, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (1983); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a
New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879 (1982); Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibil-
ity of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984);
Symposium on Science and Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983); see also 3 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 18, 702[03]; Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert
Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed
Amendment to Federal Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 102 (1986); Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sci-
osophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319 (1990); Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A
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Criticism of Frye stems from two interrelated concerns. First, the
Frye test has been criticized on its own terms as unsound policy.105
Second, courts and commentators have argued that Frye is incom-
patible with the plain meaning, as well as the spirit, of Rule 702.106
On the first point, the Frye test has been criticized as "too mallea-
ble" and vague.' 0 7 Courts can easily "manipulate the parameters of
the relevant 'scientific community' and the level of agreement
needed for 'general acceptance.' "108 Furthermore, courts vary in
their examinations of whether evidence derives from novel sci-
ence. 0 9 One of Frye's attractions is that it is easy to apply. Yet this
ease of application has led, in some cases, to an "uncritical accept-
ance of prior judicial, rather than scientific, opinion as a basis for
finding 'general acceptance.' "10
Second, and equally important, the Frye test fundamentally con-
flicts with the Rules. As the Third Circuit explained in United States
v. Downing, "in its pristine form the general acceptance standard re-
flects a conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence that is at odds with the spirit, if not the precise language, of
the Federal Rules of Evidence."' " I The helpfulness standard is pur-
posefully broad and intended to expand the use of experts. It estab-
lishes no specific limitation on scientific evidence, novel or
otherwise.
The importance of the debate over Frye is illustrated by the newly
developing field of toxic torts. Many toxic tort cases involve difficult
questions of scientific causation, such as the effects on humans of
exposure to PCBs," 1 2 the ingestion of Bendectin, 13 and dioxin. " 4
Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 84 (1986); James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restruc-
tured and Revitalized: A Praposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 102 (1986).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (arguing that
courts cannot abdicate to scientists the responsibility for ruling on the admissibility of
evidence), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Iowa
1980) (en banc) (rejecting F-ye and explaining that distinguishing scientific from other
testimony is difficult and that general acceptance is a "nebulous concept"); 2 LOUISELL &
MUELLER, supra note 79, § 105, at 818 (citing Frye's unpredictability and tendency to
exclude useful evidence); MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 203, at 491 (arguing that the Frye
standard is appropriate for judicial notice, but too rigid a standard to control the admis-
sibility of all novel scientific evidence).
106. See generally ROTHSTEIN, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 24-25 (summarizing the de-
bate over Frye's compatibility with Rule 702).
107. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
108. Id. at 1236. See generally Giannelli, supra note 99 (describing how courts have
approached the issue of the admissibility of novel scientific evidence after Frye).
109. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 99, at 1211 ("It is unresolved whether the Frye
standard requires general acceptance of the scientific technique or of both the underly-
ing principle and the technique applying it.").
110. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236.
111. Id. at 1237.
112. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
113. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir.
1990).
114. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), a§d on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988). Another highly contested area relates to the admissibility of DNA typing in
criminal cases. See, e.g., Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1991).
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Some scholars who favor extending Frye contend that much plaintiff
expert testimony has been marred by "pseudo-science." 115 Too
many marginally qualified "experts" endorse scientific theories that
possess little scientific integrity, yet those same "experts" are in a
position to expose defendants to astronomical liability in individual
or class-action litigation." 6
Concerns over "hucksterism" and false science, however, are
nothing new. Although toxic torts cases often involve scientific
questions on the frontiers of epidemiology, it would be a mistake to
suppose that questions about expert testimony are themselves
novel. 1 7 Furthermore, it would be unwise to let one controversial
and difficult area determine the general interpretation of Rule 702.
The "tail" of the toxic tort cases should not wag the "dog" of expert
rules that also apply to smaller civil cases and criminal trials.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the admissibility of scien-
tific testimony under Rule 702. If it does, the jurisprudence of plain
meaning" 8 presumably will rule out the Court's endorsement of
Frye because nothing in the text of the Rule suggests that scientific
methodology must be generally accepted before expert testimony
based upon it is admissible. Certainly, the Court's reasoning in
Bouraily1 9 suggests that the common law's prior extensive reliance
upon Frye, and the silence of the Federal Rules and the Advisory
Committee's note, do not combine to make Frye the law in a post-
Rules regime. Unlike Bouraily, however, Frye is at the center of a
highly charged debate, with a strong and vocal constituency arguing
for its vitality. Furthermore, given the flexibility of the Rule 702
helpfulness standard, a plain meaning approach cannot yield con-
clusive results.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has proposed amending
Rule 702 so that experts may testify to "scientific, technical, or other
specialized information" if such testimony is "reasonably reliable
and will substantially assist the trier of fact."' 20 The proposal also
115. See, e.g., Chaulk v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 808,F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir.
1986) (stating that "there is hardly anything not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot
now be proved by some so-called 'expert' ") (citations omitted); see also Michael C. Mc-
Carthy, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable?'" Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 350 n.1 (1992) (compiling
scholarly and judicial calls for greater supervision of expert testimony).
116. See McCarthy, supra note 115, at 350-54 (describing improper uses of expert
testimony).
117. The problems of resolving conflicts between expert witnesses in front of lay ju-
rors were identified long ago by Learned Hand when he observed that "[t]he expert
becomes a hired champion of one side." Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considera-
tions Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 53-54 (1901).
118. Plain meaning jurisprudence is discussed supra part I.
119. Bouraily v. United States is discussed supra part II.
120. Preliminary Draft, supra note 17, at 156.
1992] 879
provides for notice to the opponent of the testimony. 12 The Com-
mittee Advisory note accompanying the proposed amendment ex-
plains that the revision is "intended to limit the use, but increase the
utility and reliability, of party-initiated opinion testimony bearing on
scientific and technical issues." 122 The Committee Advisory Note
explains that "[t]he rule does not mandate a return to the strictures
of Frye v. United States. However, the court is called upon to reject
testimony that is based upon premises lacking any significant sup-
port and acceptance within the scientific community, or that other-
wise would be only marginally helpful to the fact-finder."' 123
Furthermore, the note explains that the determination of "reason-
able reliability" and whether the testimony will "substantially assist"
the trier of fact will be decided by the trial judge as a preliminary
question pursuant to Rule 104(a).' 24
We have little philosophic objection to the requirement that sci-
entific testimony be "reasonably reliable."1 25 At some point, of
course, the reliability inquiry collapses into a Rule 401 relevance
test. If the science is not reliable, the testimony fails to pass even
minimal standards of relevancy. Beyond the minimal reliability nec-
essary to pass the low threshold of Rule 401 relevance, however, we
question how a judge would determine "reasonable reliability."
The difficulty in establishing a standard of reliability explains the
popularity of the Frye test, which, despite its drawbacks, is easy to
apply. We fear that without further direction, the revised Rule's re-
quirement of "reasonable reliability" could, despite the Advisory
note's disclaimer, lead to an informal adoption of Frye. Although
the Advisory Committee note clearly states that the Frye standard of
general acceptance does not represent the only avenue for judicial
determination of reliability, it reopens the door for Frye in a manner
121. The notice portion of Proposed Rule 702 provides:
Except with leave of court for good cause shown, the witness shall not testify
on direct examination in any civil action to any opinion or inference, or rea-
son or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as required by
Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. These proposed disclosure requirements strike us as eminently sensible and noncon-
troversial. In fact, our only objection is that the notice provision merely duplicates the
civil rules and does not go far enough. In a symposium on scientific testimony, Profes-
sor Giannelli proposed more generally that expert testimony only be admitted where the
proponent provides the adverse party with "sufficient advance written notice of intent to
use such evidence, including the nature of the expected testimony, the tests used, and
the qualifications of the person who will testify." Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 702, supra note 104, at 102. Professor Giannelli's pro-
posal, in addition to reinforcing the civil discovery rules, would have a beneficial effect in
criminal cases, where discovery is not as liberal. Id. at 106.
122. Preliminary Draft, supra note 17, at 156.
123. Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. This requirement of reliability echoes the proposal of Professor Lederer, who
suggested that "[i]f reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye
Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 84, 84 (1986) (emphasis in original).
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that, in our assessment, the current version of Rule 702 does not
allow.
More important, we question the insertion of "substantially"
before "assist."' 126 This phraseology constitutes an invitation to
federal trial judges to exclude the testimony of any expert they
doubt, even that of a highly qualified expert. This invitation contra-
venes the spirit of Rule 702, which liberalizes the basis for admis-
sion of expert testimony so that the jury may benefit from increased
scientific knowledge.127 The requirement that the testimony "sub-
stantially" assist the trier of fact also may inadvertently raise due
process concerns in criminal cases where the judge excludes rele-
vant expert testimony for the defense. 128
The "substantially assist" requirement is problematic even in civil
cases, however, given our system that designates the jury as finder
of fact and determiner of credibility. The addition of "substan-
tially" may usurp the role of the jury as factfinder. Jurors evaluate
the credibility of expert witnesses, and our system is strongly com-
mitted to the notion that lay jurors ought to make such judgments.
In many respects, then, the debate over scientific evidence is also a
debate over how much we trust the intelligence and good sense of
jurors. 129 Although the concern about "hucksters" is real, the addi-
tion of "substantially" is too powerful a tonic under the circum-
stances. This is particularly true because the addition of
"substantially" limits the entire ambit of expert testimony, not only
that which may be characterized as novel scientific evidence.
We would prefer to see trial judges continue to exclude worthless
scientific testimony within the framework of the Rule 401 relevancy/
reliability model, aided by the preliminary determination proce-
dures of Rule 104. Currently, judges exclude testimony by wit-
nesses whose competence or methodology render them unworthy of
expert status. Despite our displeasure with the current proposal for
revision of Rule 702, however, we are encouraged to see Frye men-
tioned specifically in the text of the Committee note to the proposed
126. Preliminary Draft, supra note 17, at 156.
127. See Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1991); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the Federal Rules
"embody a strong and undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some
potential for assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the
adversary process"); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 857 (3d Cir. 1990)
(noting that "in making reliability determinations, courts must err on the side of admis-
sion rather than exclusion"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
128. See Comments Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules by Professor
Myrna Raeder Concerning Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Federal Rules of Evidence (Nov. 21, 1991) (copy on file with The George Wash-
ington Law Review).
129. See, e.g., EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of
Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
577 (1984) (arguing in favor of Frye and expressing distrust of juries).
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rule. We hope that it initiates the important dialogue that is long
overdue.
Instead of the current proposed amendments to Rule 702, we ad-
vocate the Third Circuit's approach to expert testimony in United
States v. Downing, ' 30 which is faithful to the Rule 702 helpfulness
standard. Downing held that the admission of expert scientific testi-
mony "is not automatic, but conditional."'131 "First, the evidence
must survive preliminary scrutiny in the course of an in limine pro-
ceeding conducted by the [trial] judge."' 132 "This threshold in-
quiry," derived from the helpfulness standard of Rule 702, "is
essentially a balancing test, centering on two factors: (1) the relia-
bility of the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony
rests, [and] (2) the likelihood that introduction of the testimony may
in some way overwhelm or mislead thejury."' 33 Second, admission
depends upon the "fit," i.e. upon a specific showing that the prof-
fered scientific evidence will elucidate particular features of the con-
tested issue.13 4 For example, in Downing, which involved expert
testimony on eyewitness identification, the judge would have to find
that the particular features of the eyewitness identifications involved
may have impaired the accuracy of those identifications. Finally, the
district court retains discretionary authority under Rule 403 to ex-
clude any relevant evidence that would unduly waste time, confuse,
or mislead the finder of fact. 135
Downing has been widely followed.' 3 6 However, courts continue
to decide cases on both sides of the Frye issue.' 3 7 We endorse an
amendment to Rule 702 that tracks the analysis in Downing, and ex-
pressly provides for an in limine hearing on contested issues. We
are also impressed with Professor Berger's suggestion, which is
130. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
131. Id. at 1226.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991); Rubanick v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
137. For example, the Fifth Circuit en banc in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,
939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S.
Mar. 3, 1992), recently established the Frye test in that circuit. It espoused a four-part
test for scientific testimony: (1) qualification of the expert under Rule 702; (2) examina-
tion of the facts upon which the expert relies under Rule 703; (3) examination of the
expert's methodology using Frye; and (4) balancing prejudice and probative value under
Rule 403. Id. at 1110. The Fifth Circuit apparently extended Frye beyond novel scien-
tific techniques (such as polygraph or voice prints) to evaluation of methodology in
more traditional science. Id. at 1132-34 (Reavley, J., dissenting). Justices White and
Blackmun dissented from the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari in Christopher-
sen. Justice White wrote:
As the Fifth Circuit is divided, so the Court of Appeals are in disagreement.
Some continue to apply the approach set forth in Frye in deciding whether
expert evidence is admissible. But courts in other circuits have concluded
that Frye was superseded in 1975 by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
they maintain established a lower threshold for determining the admissibility
of expert evidence. Because this is an important and recurring issue, I
would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict.
60 U.S.L.W. 3597, 3597 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1992) (citations omitted).
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compatible with Downing. Professor Berger advances a "relevancy"
approach to scientific evidence. She proposes to add a sentence to
Rule 702: "When the witness seeks to testify about a scientific prin-
ciple or technique that has not previously been accorded judicial
recognition, the testimony shall be admitted if the court determines
that its probative value outweighs the dangers specified in Rule
403."138 Professor Berger's "relevancy" approach is useful because
it replicates the familiar Rule 403 standards and emphasizes the cen-
tral question that a judge must confront: the balance between the
probativeness and the potential prejudice or confusion of the testi-
mony. Unlike Rule 403, however, the proposal requires the court
affirmatively to conduct a balance in order to admit the scientific evi-
dence, although this balance need not "substantially" favor
admission.
Another possible approach to the "huckster" problem is to im-
pose a heightened standard for qualifying experts under Rule
104.139 Although it would, of course, be desirable if all experts had
written a certain number of peer-reviewed articles, or that they had
published in preferred journals, the prospect of devising a workable
protocol based upon such criteria seems totally at odds with the
flexible standard and spirit of Rule 702. Such a requirement would
also be unfair to many litigants who cannot afford to hire super-
specialized expert witnesses. 140 An overly strict definition of ex-
perts would prevent plaintiffs who cannot afford or cannot find local
experts from proving their case.141
138. Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D.
89, 89 (1987).
139. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM 205-06 (1991) (approving of some jurisdictions' limitations on experts who can
testify in medical malpractice actions);Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State
and Federal TrialJudges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 738-41 (1989) (finding that 337o of the federal judges favor making special
rules as to who is qualified to testify).
140. Consider, for example, a strict liability case involving an alleged defect in a
power mower. Under Rule 702, a plaintiff who produces a qualified mechanical engi-
neer or safety expert is not required to prove his or her expertise in the design of power
mowers to qualify the expert in a product liability case dealing with the alleged defect
design of such a product. The odds are that there may be only a few such experts, most
in the employ of the defendant manufacturers, and that a strict rule would effectively bar
a plaintiff geographically remote from urban centers, where such experts usually reside,
from court.
141. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding
that otherwise qualified Ph.D.'s are not barred from testifying as to the effect of PCB's
on humans because they are not M.D.'s), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1584 (1991); Williams v.
Pro-Tec, Inc., 908 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that self-acknowledged lack of medi-
cal expertise of expert in mechanical engineering and accident reconstruction goes only
to weight of his opinion regarding alleged defect in eyeguard worn by plaintiff hit by
racquetball); Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a
safety specialist, who had received a master's degree in safety education and a doctorate
in human factors and product safety design, could testify on whether the failure of the
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A promising solution for dealing with the problems of unreliable
or disreputable experts lies in the selective use of Rule 706, which
provides for the appointment of court-appointed experts.142 Court-
appointed expert testimony seems particularly helpful where the ex-
pert testimony appears tenuous. A major problem with the appoint-
ment of an impartial expert is cost, which the parties (usually the
plaintiff) often simply cannot afford to pay. 143 Perhaps an Advisory
Committee could recommend the creation of an expert witness
fund, derived from court filing costs or some dedicated source. 144
Availability of such a fund would make Rule 706 a more potent tool
for the administration of justice and might rectify some of the
problems with expert testimony.
We acknowledge that some judges and commentators believe that
a court-appointed expert of one view in a multiple-view case will
unduly influence the jury and may be inconsistent with the judge's
role as umpire.' 45 To remedy this potential problem, depending
forklift manufacturer to put seat belts in the forklift caused the death of the operator of a
forklift that overturned, notwithstanding that the expert was not an engineer); Ventrulli
v. Cincinnati, Inc., 850 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that, where plaintiff was injured
by a shearing machine, plaintiffs expert would be permitted to testify despite having no
experience with shears or heavy machinery; expert had been a registered safety engineer
for over twenty years and was familiar with texts concerning safety engineering and had
been President of the National Society of Professional Engineers); Hammond v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that an engineer, whose only
qualifications were sales experience in the field of automotive and agricultural equip-
ment and teaching high school automobile repair, nevertheless was permitted to testify
in products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979) (finding that an expert may testify that unguarded elevator buttons con-
stitute an alleged design defect despite expert's lack of a specific background in the
design and manufacture of elevators). But see Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399
(10th Cir.) (finding that, to be qualified, expert must have knowledge not within general
sphere of knowledge, and his opinion must rest upon a substantial foundation and assist
the trier of fact), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 511 (1990); Hoban v. Grumman Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 1129 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding doctor not competent to testify as an expert witness
where he possessed no education or experience in the field at issue), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1138
(4th Cir. 1990); Wilkinson v. Rosenthal & Co., 712 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding
that a basic understanding of an area of expertise does not necessarily imply qualifica-
tion as an expert); Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1986)
(finding doctor not competent to testify as an expert where he possessed no scientific
knowledge of the effects of drug at issue).
142. FED. R. EvID. 706.
143. Rule 706(b) provides, with respect to compensation:
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus
fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases
and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation under the
fifth amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings the compensation
shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court
directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
FED. R. EvID. 706(b).
144. In a related vein, the American Law Institute has received a proposal for "Blue
Ribbon Science Panels" and a "Federal Science Board" to assist courts in the disposi-
tion of scientific questions. 2 AMERICAN LAw INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RE-
SPONSIBILrrY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
319, 335-39 (1991).
145. See generally Stephen A. Satzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American
TrialJudge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 74-80 (1978) (discussing the problems with the association
of the court's authority with court-appointed expert witnesses and suggesting limitations
on the use of court-appointed experts).
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upon the magnitude of the case, several experts of differing views
could be appointed. Alternatively, the court could appoint an ex-
pert who merely educates the jury as to the range of permissible
views.
In any event, we see Rule 702 as a prime area for the attention of
an Advisory Committee for the Rules of Evidence. The status of
Frye needs to be resolved. Decisions, particularly in the toxic tort
and DNA areas, are appearing in virtually every issue of United States
Law Week and Criminal Law Reporter. 146 Moreover, there is much re-
cent scholarly work to consider, and much research activity
underway.1 47
IV. Rule 1101(d)(3)-Applicability of the Federal Rules in
Sentencing Hearings
Rule 1101 (d) (3) specifies that the Federal Rules (other than those
with respect to privileges) do not apply to sentencing proceed-
ings. 148 The Sentencing Reform Act (the "SRA"), 14 9 which revolu-
tionized federal sentencing and introduced guideline sentencing in
the federal courts, does not address evidentiary matters. Congress,
however, did continue to prohibit any "limitation on the [kind] of
information" a sentencing court may consider about the "back-
ground, character, and conduct" of the convicted defendant before
146. See, e.g., 50 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1466 (Feb. 26, 1992) (describing Kelly v. State, in
which the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas rejected Frye and admitted DNA test re-
sults); 60 U.S.L.W. 1117-18 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1992) (describing United States v. Jakobetz, in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit permitted the routine
admissibility of DNA profiling evidence); 50 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1254 (Dec. 18, 1991)
(describing Prater v. State, in which the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Frye and admit-
ted DNA print analysis); 50 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1163 (Nov. 20, 1991) (describing Hop-
kins v. State, in which the Indiana Supreme Court admitted DNA evidence); 60 U.S.L.W.
1030 (U.S. Aug. 20, 1991) (describing Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp. in which the New
Jersey Supreme Court expanded the admissibility of toxic tort scientific evidence).
147. For example, the Federal Judicial Center will soon report the results of a major
survey of all active federal trial judges on the characteristics of expert testimony in re-
cent federal civil trials, in which the views of the judges concerning many of the issues
addressed in this Article will be summarized.
148. Rule 1101(d) states:
(d) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not
apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions offact. The determination of questions of fact pre-
liminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined
by the court under rule 104.
(2) Grand jury. Proceedings before grand juries.
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings. Proceedings for extradition or rendition; pre-
liminary examinations in criminal cases; sentencing, or granting or re-
voking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses,
and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. I 101(d) (emphasis added).
149. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991).
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it.1 5 0 In addition, the Sentencing Commission has addressed evi-
dentiary matters in Guideline 6A1.3, which states that "the court
may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibil-
ity under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its prob-
able accuracy."''
Taken together, the three most important provisions-18 U.S.C.
§ 3661 (which prohibits limitation on information in sentencing), 28
U.S.C. § 991 (authorizing the Sentencing Commission to establish
sentencing practices), and Guideline 6A1.3 (authorizing receipt of
otherwise nonadmissible evidence in sentencing hearings)-appear
to require only a due process standard for the admissibility of evi-
dence at sentencing proceedings.1 52 Courts applying the Guidelines
accordingly have applied such a minimal constitutional standard,
150. Id. § 3661 (codifying Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)) (originally
designated 18 U.S.C. § 3577, renumbered by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(I), 98 Stat.
1837, 1987 (1984)).
151. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a)
(1992) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. Congress authorized the United States Sentencing
Commission to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal jus-
tice system." The Act creating the Sentencing Commission provides in relevant part:
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to-
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal jus-
tice system .... "
28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988) (emphasis added).
Guideline 6AI.3 also provides:
(b) The court shall resolve disputed sentencing factors in accordance with
Rule 32(a)(1), Fed. R. Crim. P. (effective Nov. 1, 1987), notify the parties of
its tentative findings and provide a reasonable opportunity for the submis-
sion of oral or written objections before imposition of sentence.
GUIDELINES, supra, 6A1.3(b).
The commentary to Guideline § 6A1.3 provides in relevant part:
The court's resolution of disputed sentencing factors will usually have a
measurable effect on the applicable punishment. More formality is therefore
unavoidable if the sentencing process is to be accurate and fair. Although
lengthy sentencing hearings should seldom be necessary, disputes about
sentencing factors must be resolved with care. When a reasonable dispute
exists about any factor important to the sentencing determination, the court
must ensure that the parties have an adequate opportunity to present rele-
vant information. Written statements of counsel or affidavits of witnesses
may be adequate under many circumstances. An evidentiary hearing may
sometimes be the only reliable way to resolve disputed issues. The sentenc-
ing court must determine the appropriate procedure in light of the nature of
the dispute, its relevance to the sentencing determination, and applicable
case law.
In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to
information that would be admissible at trial. Any information may be con-
sidered, so long as it has "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its prob-
able accuracy." Reliable hearsay evidence may be considered. Out-of-court
declarations by an unidentified informant may be considered "where there is
good cause for the nondisclosure of his identity and there is sufficient cor-
roboration by other means." Unreliable allegations shall not be considered.
GUIDELINES, supra, 6A1.3 commentary (citations omitted).
152. The due process standard is defined in pre-Guidelines cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1042 (3d Cir. 1982) (remanding for resentencing where
sentencing court inferred defendant's involvement in a crime from the fact that govern-
ment had promised not to prosecute that crime); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626,
634 (9th Cir. 1971) (remanding for resentencing where sentencing court relied on un-
substantiated charge by government agent included in the presentence report).
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demanding only some minimum indicia of reliability for evidence to
be considered in sentencing hearings.15 3 Furthermore, evidence at
sentencing is evaluated in virtually all federal courts on the basis of
the preponderance standard, the lowest trial court evidentiary
standard. 154
Before the enactment of the SRA and the promulgation of the
Sentencing Guidelines, the exclusion of sentencing from the Fed-
eral Rules gave rise to little difficulty. Judges possessed wide discre-
tion in sentencing and could rely upon evidence admissible under
the Rules, or not, as they believed fair and appropriate. Except in
the (then) rare case requiring mandatory minimum sentences, the
sentencing judge, by reason of his or her unlimited sentencing dis-
cretion, possessed the essentially untrammeled power to devalue
unreliable evidence and extirpate the effects of any questionable evi-
dence introduced during the sentencing phase.
That broad latitude and power, however, disappeared with the ad-
vent of the SRA and the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Under the new regime, the sentence is shaped, and in many respects
driven by, the trial court's factual findings, particularly the findings
that relate to relevant offense conduct not included in the conviction
itself. The finding of other nonconviction but related conduct can
raise the base offense level. 155 These findings may derive from evi-
dence that would be inadmissible under the Rules. In one common
scenario, a minor figure in a drug conspiracy may be linked by
otherwise inadmissible evidence to large quantities of drugs traf-
ficked by his coconspirators of which he was unaware. This linkage
may affect his sentencing significantly. In contrast with the pre-
153. A notable exception is United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3d
Cir. 1990), which held that the minimal due process standard is insufficient in cases
where the sentencing hearing can fairly be characterized as the key issue in controversy.
Such cases arise when the findings of fact about relevant offensive conduct not impli-
cated in the conviction itself, see GUIDELINES, supra note 151, 1BI.3, can raise the base
offense level and lead to a very substantial increase in the sentence under the Guide-
lines. Where the sentencing hearing is the " 'tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense,' "Kikumura holds that due process requires more than a "minimum indicium of
reliability." Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1103 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
88 (1986)). Kikumura also holds that, in such circumstances, "the court should examine
the totality of the circumstances, including other corroborating evidence, and determine
whether the hearsay declarations are reasonably trustworthy." Id.
154. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). In light of McMillan, the fed-
eral courts have generally rejected any higher standard of proof for use in federal sen-
tencing. See, e.g., United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1989)
(applying a preponderance of the evidence standard); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d
1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1987) (same). But see United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084,
1102-03 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying a clear and convincing standard when the facts inform-
ing the sentence may raise the base offense level and were not implicated in, but over-
shadow, the facts involved in the underlying conviction).
155. See GUIDELINES, supra note 151, lB1.3.
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Guidelines regime under the SRA, the judge is not free to compro-
mise by reducing the sentence in proportion to the degree of per-
suasiveness of the evidence bearing on the sentencing factors.
Under the aegis of the Sentencing Guidelines, the minimum con-
stitutional standard often results in the following scenario: The
government declines to prosecute a defendant on certain charges
because it cannot establish sufficient legally admissible evidence to
meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the
Guidelines' broad definition of relevant conduct in section 1B1.3,
the defendant could nonetheless receive a substantially higher sen-
tence based on unindicted conduct, evidence of which is introduced
at the sentencing hearing.1 56 Thus, even though that evidence
would have been inadmissible at trial, and even though the standard
of proof at sentencing is far lower than at trial, the defendant's sen-
tence is drastically increased. Arguably tenuous evidence can in-
crease the sentence in three common ways: (1) by increasing the
amount of the drugs in the offense; (2) by increasing the dollar
amount of the fraud involved in the offense; and (3) by linking a
firearm to the underlying criminal activity. In all three cases, the
related conduct substantially increases the sentence.' 57
Although some evidentiary disputes as to the admissibility of evi-
dence in sentencing proceedings relate to matters of relevancy, the
dispute more often revolves around hearsay problems.15 8 Hearsay
comes not only from unsubstantiated presentence reports, but also
from testimony in other proceedings, such as codefendants' tri-
als.' 59 Every court of appeals to address the problem has held that
156. Astoundingly, the same result may obtain even for acquitted conduct. See, e.g.,
United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding the trial
court's consideration at the sentencing stage of the defendant's possession of a handgun
despite his acquittal of the substantive firearm offense).
157. See GUIDELINES, supra note 151, 2D1.l(c) (drug quantity table); Id. 2Fl.l(b)(1)
(fraud amount schedule); Id. 2A2.2(b)(2) (base level for aggravated assault increased if
firearm is discharged).
158. Questions have also arisen concerning the use of evidence barred by the exclu-
sionary rule at sentencing. See David N. Adair, Jr. & Toby D. Slawsky, Fact-Finding in
Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 58, 63 (describing the effect of the exclusion-
ary rule on the admissibility of evidence at sentencing); see, e.g., United States v. Lynch,
934 F.2d 1226, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that exclusionary rule does not bar
consideration of illegally seized evidence in sentencing hearings, but leaving open
whether such evidence would be admissible if police knowingly failed to comply with the
Fourth Amendment to introduce evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3478
(U.S.Jan. 13, 1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (raising
the question of whether evidence of warrantless search should be excluded at sentenc-
ing), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S.Jan. 13, 1992); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d
321, 325 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that suppressed evidence may be considered in deter-
mining the appropriate range of the sentence).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d-363, 365 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
that testimony from trial of codefendant admissible to establish sentencing facts if de-
fendant receives notice that it will be used); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177,
1181 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990); see also Adair & Slawsky, supra
note 159, at 61-62 (discussing standards of reliability required by several circuits). But
see United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1990) (finding that code-
fendants' trial testimony cannot be used in sentencing over defendant's objection).
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hearsay is not excludable in sentencing proceedings. 160 For exam-
ple, the Eleventh Circuit has written that the district court "could
consider any information, including 'reliable hearsay' from the trial
of a third party, so long as the defendant has 'the opportunity to
rebut the evidence or generally to cast doubt upon its reliabil-
ity.' "161 In that case, the court held that the "[alppellant was given
an opportunity at his sentencing hearing to challenge the evidence
against him. He has not shown that the hearsay statements consid-
ered by the court were unreliable."1 62
This development is disconcerting. Under traditional evidentiary
and Federal Rules analysis, the notion of "reliable hearsay" is, theo-
retically at least, an oxymoron. Hearsay that does not fall into a
specified exception or into a "residual" exception 163 is generally ex-
cluded because it is presumed to lack circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. 164 Thus, in assessing admissibility of evidence in
sentencing hearings, courts have turned the general approach to
hearsay on its head. The hearsay is presumed reliable-the defend-
ant has the burden of demonstrating otherwise.
The argument against applying the Federal Rules to sentencing
proceedings is powerful. By their nature, sentencing hearings re-
quire the development of background evidence about the defendant
that may derive from stale and distant events. Furthermore, strict
application of the Rules would prolong sentencing hearings that, as
important as they are, already expend much precious time.
Nevertheless, sentencing proceedings are arguably the most im-
portant judicial business conducted by Article III judges. This is
particularly true because the SRA and the various Anti-Drug Abuse
Acts' 65 have resulted in significant increases in the average sentence
in federal court. The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts have legislated numer-
ous long, mandatory, minimum sentences that are also driven by
160. See, e.g., United States v. Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1990) (approving
use of hearsay in presentence report to establish sentencing fact if such hearsay is suffi-
ciently reliable); United States v. Murillo, 902 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1990) (same);
United States v. Blanco, 888 F. 2d 907, 908 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). See generally Adair
and Slawsky, supra note 159, at 60-63 (discussing the role and reliability of presentence
reports).
161. United States v. Query, 928 F.2d 383, 385 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1990)).
162. Id.; see also GUIDELINES, supra note 151, 6A1.3 commentary (stating that "reliable
hearsay evidence may be considered").
163. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(3).
164. Indeed, that the residual exception imposes serious restrictions on the admissi-
bility of hearsay bolsters the argument against its generalized admission in sentencing
proceedings.
165. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4318 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-858 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (same); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Star. 2030 (same).
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facts found at sentencing hearings.' 66 The new sentencing regime
surely was not anticipated by the framers of Rule 1101(d) (3), who
promulgated the Rules well over a decade before the SRA was en-
acted. Given the centrality of the district court's findings under the
new regime, reliance upon inadmissible evidence at the sentencing
stage presents a serious problem. The exclusion of sentencing pro-
ceedings from the ambit of the Rules is particularly important be-
cause the Guidelines have resulted in a large increase in the
proportion of the convicted defendants sentenced to prison.' 67 The
Guidelines have also increased the sentences imposed for many
crimes, particularly white-collar crimes. In these instances, the de
facto liberty interest is tried at the sentencing hearing, not the trial,
and yet the evidentiary standards required in trials are absent.
There is no inherent reason why the Rules cannot be applied, at
least in part, to sentencing proceedings, or why some special rules
could not be devised. Any amendment to the Federal Rules super-
sedes, by reason of the Rules Enabling Act, 168 both the SRA and any
promulgations of the Sentencing Commission, at least if there is
clear notice to Congress.
Early efforts to establish a constitutional standard higher than
minimal due process have met with only limited success. Two cir-
cuits have superimposed Confrontation Clause limitations upon
sentencing hearings, but the panels in these cases were sharply di-
vided, and the opinions were vacated and will be reviewed en
banc.169 Moreover, most courts that have considered this issue have
held that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing. 170
We suggest that the Supreme Court, acting through an Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, amend the Rules to include
more protections to reflect the changed role of sentencing hear-
ings. 17 1 One approach would be to make selected Rules applicable
in sentencing proceedings. The idea of special rules for sentencing
proceedings seems eminently sensible. Just as there are special
rules for § 2254 and § 2255 proceedings, 172 sentencing proceedings
seem to be a prime candidate for such treatment. Alternatively, the
166. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6055, 102 Stat.
4318, 4367 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988)).
167. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1990 (figs. 5, 11).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988). The "supersession clause" of the Rules Enabling
Act provides: "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect." Id.
169. See United States v. Silverman, 945 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir.), vacated, Nos. 90-3205,
90-5733, 90-5816, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28543 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 1991) (en banc);
United States v. Wise, 923 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), vacated, No. 90-1070WA, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 4326 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1991); United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100
(8th Cir. 1990).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Byrd, 898
F.2d 450, 452-53 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180-81
(10th Cir. 1990).
171. Any such amendment, of course, is subject to congressional approval under 28
U.S.C. § 2074.
172. Id. §§ 2254-2255. These sections provide post-conviction remedies to prisoners
held in state or federal custody, respectively. Section 2254 governs motions for habeas
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Court could prescribe a general rule that: (1) when the challenged
evidence may have a significant impact on the actual sentence; and
(2) where a timely objection-presumably promptly upon receipt of
the presentence investigation report and well before the sentencing
hearing-is interposed, the evidence must meet a strong reliability
standard (in contrast to the minimum constitutional standard). This
rule might be stated as a requirement that the proponent of the evi-
dence must establish that it is trustworthy by a clear and convincing
standard.
An Advisory Committee might also consider the standard of proof
for facts that affect the Guidelines calculation. As the foregoing dis-
cussion suggests, the standards for admissibility of evidence and of
the requisite level of proof are closely related, at least in terms of
measuring the ultimate fairness of sentencing proceedings. The
Committee might consider the Third Circuit approach of increasing
the standard to a clear and convincing level of proof where the sen-
tencing hearing is the "tail that wags the dog" of the substantive
offense, 173 or, alternatively, prescribing a sliding scale whereby the
level of proof increases or decreases depending upon the signifi-
cance of the relevant offense conduct that is not implicated in the
conviction itself. Such an evaluation should consider some of the
Sentencing Commission's other pronouncements on evidentiary
matters that denigrate the level of evidentiary precision required to
support a finding that may affect the sentence significantly.1 74 An
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence could balance the
various interests at stake and develop a workable proposal that
would safeguard the rights of defendants in sentencing proceedings
without unduly burdening sentencing courts. At the very least, a
manual for evidence in sentencing proceedings might be developed.
V Other Rules in Need of Review-The Legacy of Circuit Splits
and Scholarly Analysis
Considerations of time and space preclude a detailed analysis of
other rules in need of review. A number of very fine compilations
organized by rule already exist. 175 Moreover, as we demonstrate
throughout this Article, many scholars have identified flaws in vari-
ous Federal Rules, and some have proposed revisions. We there-
fore limit ourselves to identifying categories of problems that
corpus relief. Section 2255 governs motions to correct, set aside, or vacate erroneous
sentences.
173. See supra note 153.
174. See GUIDELINES, supra note 151, 2BI.1, Application Note 3 (stating that the
amount of loss in theft cases "need not be determined with precision"); Id. 2F1. 1, Appli-
cation Note 8 (stating the same With respect to loss in fraud cases).
175. See supra note 2.
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demonstrate the need for ongoing review. Our overview encom-
passes suggestions of all types, from the need to resolve major cir-
cuit splits, to the need to revisit major policy questions, to relatively
minor drafting changes.
A. Circuit Splits
The circuits are sharply divided on a number of crucial issues, as
well as some more minor questions. Circuit splits are detrimental
because they undermine the goal of uniformity that underlies the
enactment of Federal Rules.
1. Rule 103: Harmless Error
Rule 103(a) states that an evidentiary ruling may not be reversible
error "unless a substantial right of the party is affected."' 176 Some
circuits have held that the standard of review for harmless error in a
civil case is whether the substantial rights of the parties were "more
probably than not untainted by the error."' 77 Other circuits, how-
ever, have held that a higher standard applies. They hold that the
standard of review for harmless error is the same for both criminal
and civil cases; thus, errors "are not harmless unless it is 'highly
probable' that they did not affect a party's substantial rights." 178
Although the standard of review is not ordinarily a matter within the
scope of the Federal Rules, in view of this division within the courts,
an Advisory Committee might wish to study the matter and formu-
late a revised rule, or at least draft a policy statement on the
issue. ' 79
176. FED. R. EVID. 103(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988) (stating that appellate
court should give judgment "without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of parties"); FED. R. Civ. P. 61 (stating that "[n]o error.., is ground
for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict.., unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice"); I WEINST-IN & BERGER, supra
note 18, 1 103[01], at 103-6 (arguing for reversal if a substantial right of a party is
affected). Obviously, determining what is substantial is itself a challenge. See Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946) (stating that "what may be technical for one is
substantial for another; what minor and unimportant in one setting crucial in another").
177. Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1983); accord
United States Indus. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1253 (10th Cir. 1988); Smith
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 778 F.2d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 1985); McIlroy v. Dittmer, 732 F.2d
98, 105 (8th Cir. 1984). Professor Saltzburg supports this view. See Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988, 998 (1973).
178. McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)); Williams
v. United States Elevator Corp., 920 F.2d 1019, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that "in
civil cases courts should apply the same standard as announced in Kotteakos v. United
States, a criminal case") (citation omitted); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gosdin, 803 F.2d
1153, 1159 (11 th Cir. 1986) (same); O'Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1308 n.3
(5th Cir. 1977) (same). Louisell and Mueller appear to support this view. They com-
mend Justice Traynor's test of high probability that applies to both criminal and civil
cases as being "concise and readily understood." 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79,
§ 18, at 90-91.
179. See EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 9 ("Some users of the Rules have sug-
gested that it might be preferable to have a harmless error standard specified in the
rule.... A uniform standard could not make the law less clear than it now is, but it
probably is unduly optimistic to believe that because a standard is stated it will be signifi-
cantly easier to distinguish harmful from harmless error.").
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2. Rule 407: Subsequent Remedial Measures
The circuits are divided over whether Rule 407, which excludes
evidence of subsequent remedial measures,1 80 applies in products
liability cases. A majority of courts have held that the Rule excludes
evidence of subsequent remedial measures for claims of design de-
fect based upon a theory of strict products liability.""1 Other courts,
however, have declined to apply the Rule to products liability
cases.1 8 2 In some respects, the differences among the circuits reflect
their divergent views of the strict liability cause of action, and their
various perceptions of how the Rule 407 exclusion would affect
safety improvements by manufacturers. In their various opinions,
courts rely upon everything from plain meaning to law and econom-
ics to determine the applicability of Rule 407 to products liability
cases. 183
The matter is complicated, however, by Erie considerations.
180. Rule 407 provides in relevant part: "When, after an event, measures are taken
which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event." FED. R. EvID. 407.
181. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-70 (7th Cir. 1984)
(finding that the policy behind Rule 407 makes it applicable to strict products liability
cases); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 886-88 (5th Cir.
1983) (following other circuits in applying Rule 407 to strict liability cases); Josephs v.
Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule 407 applies to prod-
ucts liability actions, based on the court's interpretation of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that "[t]he
failure of Rule 407 to refer explicitly to actions in strict liability does not prevent its
application to such actions"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co.,
628 F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that policy and common law bases for
Rule 407 favor its applicability to strict liability actions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding no error
in trial court's refusal to admit evidence of post-accident repairs); see also Seidelson, supra
note 1, at 471-76 (arguing that the Rule should apply in strict liability cases). See generally
LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 71, at 193-94 (describing the circuit split on the appli-
cability of Rule 407 to strict liability cases); ROTSTmIN, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 115-
20 (collecting cases).
182. See, e.g., Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 931-32
(10th Cir.) (holding that Rule 407 does not apply to strict liability actions as matter of
state policy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984).
183. On the issue of a plain meaning interpretation of the Rule, compare Robbins v.
Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that
"Rule 407 [does not apply to products liability cases because it] is, by its terms, confined
to cases involving negligence or other culpable conduct") with Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469
(rejecting "purely semantic argument" and noting that apportionment of damages indi-
cates a willingness to attach blame to products manufacturers, hence rendering them
"culpable"). On the issue of law and economics, compare Ault v. International Har-
vester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1974) (reasoning that "it is manifestly unrealistic
to suggest that such a producer will forego making improvements in its product, and risk
innumerable additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effects upon the public im-
age") with Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469 (reasoning that "accidents are low-probability
events" and that the "probability of another accident may be much smaller than the
probability that the victim of the accident that has already occurred will sue ... and
make devastating use at trial of any [remedial] measures").
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These cases derive from state causes of action and generally arise in
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. In Erie parlance,
the justifications for Rule 407 appear overwhelmingly substantive.
Because the Federal Rules were promulgated by Congress, there is
no Rules Enabling Act issue presented, and the question is essen-
tially a constitutional one under Hanna v. Plumer. 18 4 Some suggest
that if a federal court's interpretation of Rule 407 conflicts with a
state rule governing subsequent remedial measures, sound policy
derived from the principles of Erie dictates that state law should con-
trol, and that Rule 407 may be unconstitutional under the Hanna
standard.1 85 However, others believe that the Rule is clearly consti-
tutional, and agree with Judge Posner's sharp rejection of the Erie
argument in Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. 18 6 Although Judge Posner
acknowledged the "substantive consequences" of Rule 407, he re-
lied upon Hanna v. Plumer for the proposition that the Rule falls
"'within the uncertain area between substance and procedure'"
and hence should be classified as procedural for Erie purposes.' 8 7
Judge Posner concluded that he was
reluctant to cast a cloud over the whole federal rulemaking enter-
prise and open a new chapter in constitutional jurisprudence by
holding that a procedural rule is beyond even the power of Con-
gress to enact for application to diversity cases, because the rule
affects substantive questions that the Erie doctrine reserves to the
states. 188
Products liability cases comprise a significant portion of the
docket of many federal courts. The presence of a circuit split and of
a disparate approach to the theoretical underpinnings of Rule 407
make this area ripe for an Advisory Committee's attention.' s9
3. Rule 703: Experts' Reasonable Reliance on Otherwise Inadmissible
Evidence
The recognition that an expert's testimony often derives from
inadmissible (often hearsay) sources resulted in the Rule 703 rea-
sonable reliance standard, permitting experts to ground their testi-
mony in inadmissible evidence, provided that it is of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. 190
The circuits are split on the question of who should determine an
184. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
185. See 2 LouISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79, § 167, at 428 (stating that "[aipplying
the federal provision in this context amounts to an unwarranted incursion upon the Erie
doctrine-one apparently not intended by Congress, one which is arguably unconstitu-
tional, and one which arguably violates both the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules
Enabling Act"); 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, 407[02], at 407-14 (suggesting
that because Rule 407 involves extrinsic substantive policies and imputes no special fed-
eral interest, state law should be followed in its interpretation).
186. 733 F.2d at 463.
187. Id. at 471-72 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472).
188. Id. at 472.
189. See Berger, supra note 1, at 266 (stating that "[t]here is nothing to be gained by
leaving this question open for further judicial resolution, other than an incentive for
forum shopping ... and a consequent expenditure ofjudicial resources").
190. Rule 703 provides:
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expert's "reasonable reliance" on otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence. 19' Some courts hold that reasonable reliance is a prelimi-
nary determination, analogous to qualification of witnesses that the
trial court makes under Rule 104(a). These courts hold that the dis-
trict judge must undertake "an independent analysis of the trust-
worthiness of the data underlying the expert opinions."' 92 Other
courts, noting that the drafters of Rule 703 purposefully adopted a
liberal standard that relied upon the experts in the field, hold that
reasonable reliance depends upon the experts themselves. 193
Although we acknowledge the burden on the trial judge in making
an independent determination, 194 we believe that judges should de-
termine the extent of reasonable reliance.' 9 5 At all events, this cir-
cuit split should be resolved.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
191. Compare Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding
that the reliability of the basis is generally considered a matter for the profession, and
the court cannot reject the expert's uncontested testimony as to acceptability) and
United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392, 395-96 (7th Cir. 1987) (same) and In rejapanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277 (3d Cir. 1983) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) with Ricciardi v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 811 F.2d
18, 25 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that the court, pursuant to Rule 104, must determine
reasonable reliance) and In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (same), afd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
192. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1324
(E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574
(1986). Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation observed that:
[T]he court may not abdicate its independent responsibilities to decide if the
bases meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admissibility.
If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no
reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests
entirely upon them must be excluded.
In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1245.
193. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d at 277-78; Seese v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981);
Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66
B.U. L. REV. 521, 526-30 (1986). See generally Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of
Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986) (discussing courts' attempts to de-
fine the scope of admissible expert testimony); Paul Rothstein & Michael A. Crew, When
Should the Judge Keep Expert Testimony from the Juy, 1 INSIDE LITiG. 19 (1987) (setting forth
cases on both sides of the question).
194. See EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 177 (raising this criticism).
195. Our view comports with that of the district court in In re Japanese Electronic
Products Antitrust Litigation, 505 F. Supp. at 1313. We recognize that at first blush our
position on Rule 703 seems to conflict with our approach to Rule 702, where we rejected
the Frye test as being overly conservative and incompatible with the inclusive tenor of
the Federal Rules. See supra part III. If any contradiction exists at all, however, it is
reflected in the Rules themselves. We believe that in both cases, our reading is the more
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4. Rule 801(d)(1)(B): Prior Consistent Testimony
Another circuit split concerns the admissibility of prior consistent
testimony. Rule 801(d) (1) (B) immunizes from hearsay treatment
(and admits as substantive evidence) prior consistent statements
"offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive," where the
declarant is available to testify and is subject to cross examina-
tion.' 9 6 The proffered statement need not have been made in a
prior proceeding or under oath.19 7 Some courts have grafted an ad-
ditional guarantee of reliability to Rule 801 (d) (1) (B). They apply the
exemption from hearsay only where prior consistent statements
were made before the motive to fabricate.' 98 The circuits are split on
this temporal requirement that appears nowhere in the language of
the Rule, but has a venerable common law history.' 99 Some courts
treat the timing issue as a matter of evaluating the relevance of the
natural reading. The consistency of our position transcends mere plain meaning, how-
ever, as well it should given our dislike for an overly mechanical reading of the Rules.
See supra part I.
In interpreting Rule 702, we assert our confidence in the ability of the civil jury to
discern and reject false science when it intrudes upon the liberal standard of admission
of scientific evidence. But that same generosity of spirit does not license the experts
themselves to circumvent the Rules. Even where an expert relies upon evidence that all
others in the field use in making their assessment, the court must nevertheless assure
itself that the expert's testimony comports with the overarching requirement of reasona-
bleness.
Furthermore, the Frye standard and a liberal reading of Rule 703, both of which we
reject, would hamstring a trialjudge. The tests we propose, Downing's interpretation of
the Rule 702 helpfulness standard and the district court's opinion in Japanese Electronic,
would allow the trial judge to conduct individual and independent balancing of the evi-
dence in the case. Rather than abdicate control to the scientific community, either
through the parsimony of the Frye rule or the blind acceptance of allowing experts to
dictate the boundaries of "reasonable reliance," we elevate the one actor who is in the
best position to make both these judgments: the trial judge.
196. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
197. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-185.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978); see also EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 2,
at 202 (describing some courts' requirement that the prior consistent statement come
before the motive to fabricate); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18,
801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-195 (same); Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New Pro-
posal, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 285-287 (same); Judith A. Archer, Note, Prior Consistent
Statements: Temporal Admissibility Standard Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 759, 770-78 (1987) (same).
199. Compare United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir.) (requiring that consistent
statement be made before motive to falsify), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 812 (1988) and United
States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987)
and United States v. Stuart, 718 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1983) (same) and United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979) with United
States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (relaxing common law timeline re-
quirement that consistent statement be made before motive) and United States v. Hamil-
ton, 689 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983) and United
States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981)
and United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978). For an interesting recent
opinion discussing the circuit split, see United States v. Montague, No. 91-3012, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 3740 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 1992) (rejecting the temporal requirement
and delineating the split in authority). See generally 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
18, 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-196 nn.13-14 (listing cases); Archer, supra note 198, at
770-71 nn.60-61 (same).
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prior consistent statement, but not as a "hard and fast rule of admis-
sibility." 200 In light of the Supreme Court's plain meaning ap-
proach, 20 1 this requirement, although logical, might not survive
scrutiny. 20 2 The Rule would benefit from an Advisory Committee's
review.
5. Rule 803(3): State of Mind Exception to Hearsay-The Hillmon
Doctrine
Another circuit split revolves around the scope of the state of
mind exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(3) was inspired by the
famous case of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,203 which rendered
statements of intent by a declarant admissible to prove not only the
declarant's future conduct but also that of another person. Rule
803(3) excepts from hearsay "[a] statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition[,]
such as intent, plan, motive." 20 4 Although there is very little case
law on point, there is a split in authority on whether Rule 803(3)
renders admissible only the declarant's statements about his own
plans, or whether it also renders admissible circumstantial evidence
of the future conduct of another.20 5
This confusion about the scope of Rule 803(3) is compounded by
the legislative history. The HouseJudiciary Committee rejected the
expansive interpretation of Hillmon as including circumstantial evi-
dence of a third-party's activities. 206 The Senate and Conference
Reports, however, do not discuss the issue. 20 7 Once again, the scru-
tiny of an Advisory Committee would be beneficial.
200. Hamilton, 689 F.2d at 1273, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983).
201. See supra part I.
202. Prior consistent statements made after motive to fabricate might pass the low
threshold of Rule 401's relevancy requirement on the theory that repetition of the state-
ment has some tendency, however slight, of making the statement more likely to be true.
203. 145 U.S. 285 (1892)
204. FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
205. Compare United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that
state of mind evidence of victim's plans can serve as circumstantial evidence of the activ-
ity of the defendant), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) with Gual Morales v. Hernandez
Vega, 579 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1978) (indicating, in dicta, that statement that one planned
to visit the defendant would not be admissible under Rule 803(3) against the defend-
ant). See generally LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 71, at 427-30 (discussing various
judicial approaches to Rule 803(3)); 4 WEINsTIN & BERGER, supra note 18, 803(3) [04]
(arguing that the judiciary has been extremely circumspect about relying upon Rule
803(3) when the action of a person other than the declarant is involved); Seidelson, supra
note 1, at 453 (discussing, among other Rules, Rule 803(3), the Hillmon doctrine, and
their interaction); Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule
803(3), 64 TEMP. L.Q. 145 (1991) (analyzing Rule 803(3) and the problem of implied or
indirect assertions about external conditions).
206. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7075, 7087.
207. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
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6. Rule 804(b)(1): Former Testimony-The Predecessor-in-Interest
Requirement
Another circuit split revolves around the definition of the "prede-
cessor-in-interest" requirement of the former testimony exception
to hearsay. Rule 804(b)(1) admits testimony of an unavailable wit-
ness in a civil case if the party against whom the testimony is offered,
or his predecessor-in-interest, possessed a similar motive and op-
portunity to cross examine the witness. The definition is compli-
cated by a tortured legislative history. The predecessor-in-interest
requirement was added to the Rule to restrict its scope.208 The
original draft of the Rule would have permitted the use of former
testimony in civil trials any time the witness was cross-examined by
someone with similar motive and opportunity. 209 In Lloyd v. Ameri-
can Export Lines, Inc., 210 the Third Circuit construed the predecessor-
in-interest language as mandating only a "sufficient community of
interest" between the prior litigant and party against whom the
hearsay is offered. 21i This construction arguably reads the prede-
cessor-in-interest standard out of the Rule, and thus contravenes
the intent of Congress when it specifically added the predecessor-in-
interest language. 212 Many courts have followed Lloyd's interpreta-
tion,213 but others have adhered to a more narrow interpretation.2 14
Uniformity is desirable here, and an Advisory Committee could be
the vehicle to attain it.
7. Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5): Notice in the Residual Hearsay
Exceptions
Finally, there is a split among the circuits concerning the rigid
notice requirements of the residual hearsay exceptions.2 15 Some
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098. See A FRESH REVIEW, supra note 2, 120 F.R.D. at 378 (noting the lack
of clarity of the Senate and Conference reports); EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at
222-24 (noting the tension between the House Judiciary Committee Report and the
"conspicuous silence" of the Senate Report); 5 LouISE.LL & MUELLER, supra note 79,
§ 442, at 561-62 (arguing that the more limited language of the House Report should
control and that Senate silence should be deemed assent); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 18, 803(3), at 803-35 (describing the differences between the committee reports).
208. See Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Study in
Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 295, 299
(1989).
209. See id. at 312. Nine states have adopted this expansive version. See EMERGING
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 259 & n.10 (citing 2 EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL
RULES IN THE STATES §§ 59.2 to 59.4 (Gregory P. Joseph & Stephen A. Saltzburg eds.,
1991)).
210. 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978).
211. Id. at 1185-86. See generally LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 71, at 476-78 (dis-
cussing the policy of the same party requirement).
212. See Weissenberger, supra note 208, at 311-18 (discussing the legislative history of
Rule 804(b)(1)).
213. See, e.g., Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984). See generally Weissenberger, supra note 208, at
319 n.120 (listing cases).
214. See, e.g., In re Screws Antitrust Litig., 526 F. Supp. 1318, 1319 (D. Mass. 1981).
See generally Weissenberger, supra note 208, at 319 n. 121 (listing cases that applied the
predecessor-in-interest test more narrowly).
215. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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courts adhere to the notice requirements; others ignore them.216 In
our view, the rigid requirements are ill-advised, for they do not per-
mit the judge sufficient discretion.2 1 7  An Advisory Committee
should examine closely the residual exception, and, at a minimum,
propose a redraft to promote more flexibility.
B. Gaps in the Rules
Aside from circuit splits, there are obvious problems in applying
the Federal Rules that derive from omissions in the language of the
Rules.
1. Rule 201: Judicial Notice
The Rules address judicial notice of adjudicative facts but do not
encompass judicial notice of legislative facts.2 18 The Rules' failure
to address legislative facts has been criticized as too narrow and
unambitious.2 19 This lack of guidance has led to concerns sur-
rounding the process for noticing legislative facts. 220 The issue of
legislative facts is particularly interesting in the context of toxic tort
cases.2 2 1 An Advisory Committee should consider filling this gap in
216. Compare United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that
Congress intended that the requirement of advance notice be rigidly enforced) with
United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that the residual ex-
ception notice requirements may be waived if defense counsel had a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet the testimony).
217. Others join us in this view. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18,
803(24)[01], at 803-294 (citing and criticizing courts that have adopted an "unwarranted
rigidity, unmindful of Rule 102 and trial realities"); Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach
to Hearsay Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 51, 116 (1987) (stating that the "notice provision is
far too strict").
218. Adjudicative facts are facts submitted to factfinders in court trials. As the Advi-
sory Committee stated:
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative
facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to legal reasoning
and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle
or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.
FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note, subdivision (a); see Kenneth C. DavisJudi-
cial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955) (discussing the differences between legis-
lative and adjudicative facts).
219. See FJC, REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that "[s]ubstantial scholarly criticism
... is aimed mainly at the fundamental theory of the draft of the Rule limiting its appli-
cation to adjudicative facts"); Kenneth C. Davis,Judicial Notice, 1969 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513,
513-14, 530-32 (offering seven criticisms of the rule ofjudicial notice, including that the
Rule is limited to adjudicative facts); Irving Younger, Symposium: The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence-Introduction, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 251, 252 (1984) (criticizing the Rules for not
addressing judicial notice of legislative facts). See generally LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra
note 71, at 838-52 (discussing and criticizing the judicial notice Rule).
220. See Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise
Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1988) (discussing courts' difficulty in interpreting the
federal Rule). Cases showing the difficulties presented because judicial notice is only
partly covered by Rule 201 are collected and summarized in PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, EVI-
DENCE: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1293-310 (1986).
221. One of the leading cases discussing the nature and effect of legislative facts is In
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the Rule. In addition, it might consider addressing the question of
judicial notice of law. Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure addresses this subject with respect to foreign law,222 and refers
to the Federal Rules of Evidence. We believe that such a provision
belongs in the Rules of Evidence as well.
2. Rule 301: Presumptions
The Rules concerning presumptions have been criticized in a sim-
ilar vein as being incomplete and "uncourageous" because they do
not prescribe in detail the effect of a presumption after it has shifted
the burden of going forward.2 23 That is, the Rules do not address
whether the presumption stays in the case and serves as some evi-
dence of the presumed fact, or whether it vanishes, like the famous
"bursting bubble" of Thayer and Wigmore. In addition, Article III
of the Rules contains no provision relevant to criminal proceed-
ings. 224 These gaps in Rule 301 should be addressed by the pro-
posed Advisory Committee.
3. Rule 410: Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related
Statements
Rule 410 excludes "any statement made in the course of plea dis-
cussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority." 225
Although Rule 410 already has been amended twice,226 one review-
ing body has proposed that the Rule be amended again to exclude
statements made to law enforcement officers who undertook (or in-
dicated that they were undertaking) the discussion at the request of
the prosecuting attorney.227 This avoids the unfairness of admitting
re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988),
which addressed who decides, and how, whether asbestos hazards were knowable to the
industry in the 1930s. In that case, the industry challenged, on federal equal protection
grounds, the New Jersey Supreme Court's judge-made law rejecting the "state-of-the-
art" defense in asbestos cases while recognizing it in other types of strict liability cases.
Id. at 1235-36. One member of the majority would have held that the court merely had
noticed the legislative fact that the hazards of asbestos exposure were knowable to the
industry at all relevant times, and that it was thus a factual determination the court had
made, and not a special legal rule. Id. at 1245-51.
222. Rule 44.1. Determination of Foreign Law
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country
shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court,
in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source,
including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination shall be
treated as a ruling on a question of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
223. See Younger, supra note 219, at 253.
224. See FJC, REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (noting a gap in the law stemming from Con-
gress' failure to adopt the original Advisory Committee's proposed Rule, and citing a
lack of direction for trial courts).
225. FED. R. EVID. 410(4).
226. See supra note 4.
227. See A FRESH REVIEW, supra note 2, 120 F.R.D. at 339-40; see also EMERGING
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 65-66 (discussing cases where the defendant discusses pleas
with law enforcement officers, and distinguishing cases where the officers are authorized
to negotiate on behalf of the prosecuting attorney and those where the officers lacked
authority to plea bargain).
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prior discussions that the defendant reasonably believed were con-
ducted by police on behalf of the prosecuting attorney. The propo-
sal extends protection to plea discussions on an agency
relationship.228 This proposed amendment would fill a void cur-
rently existing in the Rules.
4. Rule 606(b): Juror Competency
An Advisory Committee should also examine carefully a small,
but potentially vital, gap in the Rules on juror competency. Rule
606(b)'s restrictive policies concerning the competency of jurors to
testify are sensible protections of the integrity of jury verdicts and
jurors' personal privacy. The Rule permits post-deliberation testi-
mony by a juror only to discuss "extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion" or "outside influence." 229 The Rule, however, apparently
excludes threats or duress by jury members against one another in
the course of deliberation. 230 We agree with the ABA Report inso-
far as it proposes that the Rule be broadened to fill this present void
in Rule 606(b) by permitting inquiry into such threats.23 '
228. This contrasts with an earlier amendment to Rule 410, which eliminated a bar-
gain with a police officer from the scope of Rule 410. The amendment was made be-
cause defendants were able to exclude otherwise admissible discussions with police
officers on the ground that they were engaging in plea negotiations. The pendulum has
swung too far however, and now even genuine attempts at plea bargains with law en-
forcement officers fall outside the rigid requirement that the plea discussion must be
with the attorney only. For a discussion of these changes to Rule 410 and of the admissi-
bility of plea discussions, see LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 71, at 202.
229. Rule 606(b) provides:
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity
of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or state-
ment occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect
of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing
the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning
the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that ajuror may
testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was im-
properly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit
or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which
the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
230. See EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 127; see, e.g., United States v.
Casamayor, 837 F.2d 1509 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that alleged harassment of one ju-
ror by another would not be competent evidence to impeach the verdict under Rule
606(b)); United States v. Blackburn, 446 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir 1971) (same), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1017 (1972); United States v. Stoppelman, 406 F.2d 127 (1st Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969); Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.R.D. 344
(E.D. Ark. 1980) (same).
231. See A FRESH REViEW, supra note 2, 120 F.R.D. at 353-54 (proposing another ex-
ception "or as to any threats of violence or violent acts brought to bear on jurors to
reach a verdict"); see also 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79, § 287, at 132 (noting
that scholars have advocated permitting jurors to testify about threats by other jurors
and citing Ronald L. Carlson & Steven M. Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms for
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C. Inconsistencies in the Rules
The Rules are intelligently drafted, but small errors and minor
contradictions do exist. Such errors range from simple typographi-
cal errors to logical inconsistencies. For example, a number of com-
mentators have criticized contradictions in the Rules' treatment of
judicial notice. Rule 201(g) provides in pertinent part that in a
criminal case "the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." 23 2
This requirement is consistent with the principle that the judge can-
not direct a verdict against a criminal defendant, but results in a
conflict with Rule 201 (f), which allows a court to take judicial notice
at any stage of the proceedings, including appeals (where the jury
obviously would not have an opportunity to reject the judicially no-
ticed fact).233 Some courts have relied upon Rule 201(g) to forbid
an appellate court from taking judicial notice on appeal even for
patently obvious propositions. 23 4 In contrast, some circuits, to
avoid highly technical acquittals, do not accept this result; instead
they simply ignore the conflict in the Rule and notice facts on ap-
peal. 2 35 Still other courts find harmless error based, in part, upon
the fact that the jury would not have acquitted the defendant, even if
the instruction had been given.2 36 One solution to the conflict with
Rule 201 (f) proposes that in a criminal jury trial judicial notice may
be taken only before jury deliberations.23 7 An Advisory Committee
on the Rules could evaluate this proposal, and also propose reme-
dies for other inconsistencies in the Rules.
D. Innovative Suggestions
A further task for an Advisory Committee on Evidence would be
to pursue innovative suggestions for the Federal Rules. These sug-
gestions may come from judges, practitioners, or scholars. They
also may emerge from experiments and alterations made by various
states that have adopted the Federal Rules. For example, an Advi-
sory Committee would doubtless join the current movement to
Rule Revision, 1977 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 247, 274); Berger, supra note 1, at 267 n.60 (arguing
that Rule 606(b) be amended because the intent of the drafter was not clearly stated).
232. FED. R. EvID. 201(g).
233. See 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, 201[06], at 201-60 (noting that
although 201 (f) does not explicitly refer to appeals, courts have so applied it, even when
the matter to be noticed was not raised below).
234. See A FRESH REVIEW, supra note 2, 120 F.R.D. at 312 (noting that Rule 201(g)
prevents courts from correcting "even the most blatant procedural oversights") (citing
United States v. Dior, 671 F.2d 351, 358 n.11 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to notice Ameri-
can/Canadian exchange rate to determine if property was worth $5,000) and United
States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978) (refusing to notice that South Central Bell
Telephone was a common carrier)); 1 LouISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79, § 60, at 509
n.23 (citing constitutional policy for reading 201(g) as modifying 201 (f)).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Lavender, 602 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1979) (noticing the
fact ofjurisdiction on appeal).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Piggie, 622 F.2d 486, 488 (10th Cir.) (holding that fact
that court did not instruct the jury that it could choose whether to accept judicially no-
ticed jurisdiction was not prejudicial because the jury would have found jurisdiction re-
gardless), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980).
237. See A FRESH REVIEW, supra note 2, 120 F.R.D. at 311, 313.
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streamline litigation. Most attention in this movement has been fo-
cused upon the discovery process, and the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules has advanced proposals for significant revisions in that
area.2 38 However, recent interest also has been directed to the
problem of cost and delay attendant to lengthy trials.
Narrative statements represent one device for expediting testi-
mony.2 39 Although the flexibility afforded the trial judge by Rule
611 arguably permits the use of narrative statements, 240 neither that
Rule nor the accompanying Advisory Committee note encourages
such statements. Judge Keeton has drafted a rule that encourages
use of narrative statements. It provides that "the testimony of any
witness on any relevant subject matter as to which the witness is
competent to testify may be received either in the form of an oral
narrative answer or in the form of an affidavit." 241 In addition, the
proposal provides that "a court may at any time ask or permit coun-
sel to ask the witness to give a narrative answer, or may permit a
narrative answer to a question even if the question did not call for
that form of answer." 242 The recently proposed amendments to Ev-
idence Rule 702 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, requiring
detailed pretrial notice of the substance of testimony of experts,
suggest that more liberal use of narrative statements is a logical next
step.243
Another method of focusing trials and limiting unnecessary ap-
peals can be gleaned from the draft of Rule 103 of the proposed
New York Code of Evidence. The New York State Law Revision
Commission restated the principles governing review of rulings
based upon general and incorrect specific objections.2 44 The New
York Rule provides that error in admitting testimony may not rest
on an incorrect specific objection at trial unless the evidence was not
admissible for any purpose whatsoever. If evidence is excluded, a
238. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIM-
INARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCE-
DURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 47-70 (1989), reprinted in 127 F.R.D.
237, 312-35 (1989).
239. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.51 (5th ed. 1982) (describing
the benefits of utilizing narrative testimony).
240. Rule 611(c) provides in relevant part: "Leading questions should not be used
on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the wit-
ness' testimony." FED. R. EvID. 611(c).
241. Letter from Robert E. Keeton, Chairman of the Standing Committee of Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Members of
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (Jan. 15, 1991) (copy on
file with The George Washington Law Review).
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Oostendorp v. Khanna, 937 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding trialjudge's requirement that deposition testimony to be read to the jury be reduced to a
five-page narrative summary).
244. See Proposed NYCE § 103(a) (proposed draft 1982). Apparently, the code has
not been adopted, although succeeding drafts have been circulated.
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general objection is sufficient if any ground existed for exclusion of
the evidence, and an erroneous specific objection is not sufficient
unless the evidence was not admissible for any purpose. 245 Profes-
sor Martin, in suggesting certain clarifications to the Commission's
proposal, explained the policy behind New York's proposed rule.246
He noted that Federal Rule 103, while salutary, does not fully ad-
dress the delicate balance between providing the trial judge maxi-
mum assistance from counsel in evidentiary rulings and assuring the
right of appellate review where counsel was reasonably diligent. 247
We believe that Rule 103 may be insufficiently specific and that the
New York proposals, which specifically address the effect of objec-
tions on incorrect grounds, are worthy of consideration by an Advi-
sory Committee on the Rules of Evidence.
E. Debates over Policy
There are some Rules of Evidence that deserve reconsideration in
light of the policy issues they raise. An Advisory Committee could
examine the Rules and the concommitant policy issues, and propose
any needed revisions.
1. Rule 404(b): Other Bad Acts
There is much judicial dissatisfaction with the Rules governing
admission of character evidence, especially Rule 404(b), which rou-
tinely enables the prosecutor to present highly prejudicial evidence
of other criminal conduct by the defendant. Rule 404(b) has engen-
dered a tremendous amount of litigation and has inspired more ju-
dicial opinions, and arguably more confusion, than any other
section of the Rules. 248 The recently adopted amendment to Rule
404(b) does no more than to provide a procedural vehicle-a mo-
tion in limine-for adjudication of 404(b) disputes. 249
The ABA Report proposed a more radical redrafting of Rule
404(b) whereby in criminal cases evidence of prior bad acts could be
introduced
only if the prosecution demonstrates by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the accused committed the act in question and the
court determines that the probative value of the evidence substan-
tially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading of the jury, and that its admission would not
245. Id.
246. See Michael M. Martin, Evidence, N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1983, at 1, 2, 17.
247. Id. at 17.
248. See FJC, REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that Rule 404(b) "seems to be the
most highly litigated Rule"); 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79, § 140, at 172 (dis-
cussing the "extraordinary mass of appellate opinion" on Rule 404(b)); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 18, 404[08], at 404-52 to 404-60 (citing the "huge volume" of
perplexing and apparently contradictory opinions stemming from Rule 404(b)). See gen-
erally EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1984) (discussing
the admissibility of prior bad acts in criminal prosecutions); LEMPERT & SALTZBURG,
supra note 7 1, at 220-24 (discussing arguments for and against the admissibility of prior
bad acts).
249. See supra note 28.
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unduly delay the proceeding, waste time, or provide needlessly
cumulative evidence. 250
This proposal would reverse the Supreme Court's holding in Hud-
dleston v. United States,25t which required only a reasonable belief that
the uncharged conduct occurred. 252 Additionally, the proposal re-
casts the familiar criteria of Rule 403, requiring instead that the pro-
ponent show that the probative value substantially outweighs the
prejudice.2 55  By limiting the scope of other acts admitted by the
Rule, a revised Rule 404(b) might also encourage more judicial
analysis rather than a mere recitation of the "other purposes" ex-
ceptions to the Rule.254
This proposal would doubtless engender strong opposition from
the Department ofJustice and other law enforcement agencies. The
controversy is real, however, and it affects substantial rights of crim-
inal defendants. We believe that further study is warranted.
2. Rule 501: Privileges
An Advisory Committee should take a careful look at the Rules
covering privileges. The fact most remembered by the bar at large
about the genesis of the Rules is Congress' deletion of the privilege
rules, despite their careful drafting by the original Advisory Com-
mittee and close consideration by the Supreme Court.255 Congress
250. A FRESH REvIEw, supra note 2, 120 F.R.D. at 330. A version of this position was
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in a resolution approved by voice vote:
Be it resolved, That the American Bar Association urges that Rule 404(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and similar State rules which may govern the
purposes for which extrinsic evidence of crimes, wrongs or acts may be ad-
mitted, be amended to provide that in criminal cases:
1. Questions of preliminary fact regarding the admissibility of evidence
of the extrinsic act will be determined by the court; and
2. The existence of any preliminary fact required as a precondition to the
admission of evidence of the extrinsic act must be demonstrated by the
proponent by clear and convincing evidence.
ABA House of Delegates Report No. 109B: Summary of Action Taken by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association 38 (Midyear meeting 1989).
251. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
252. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
253. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note (citing Rule 403 as grounds
for excluding Rule 404(b) evidence).
254. For example, McCormick lists ten categories of "permissible purposes." See Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 72, § 190, at 558-65; see also 2 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 79,
§ 140, at 172 (criticizing courts' use of permissive uses with "little analysis"); 2 WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, 404[08], at 404-56 (criticizing courts' use of permissive
uses "without any analysis").
255. The FJC Report has referred to Article V as containing "the largest gap in the
Evidence Rules." FJC, REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. The report suggested that "[i]f a
new Committee on Evidence Rules is established [Article V] should have its immediate
attention." Id. Professor Younger, too, criticized the incompleteness of the Rules be-
cause "[t]hey say nothing of substance about privileges." See Younger, supra note 219, at
252. Professor Rothstein also favors a specific list of privileges. See Paul F. Rothstein,
The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 128-31 (1973).
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rejected the proposed rules of privilege because it was troubled by
the dilution of spousal and patient-physician privileges, the absence
of a news-report privilege, and the broadening of protection for
government documents. Instead of passing a law of its own, Con-
gress left state law privileges to control in diversity cases and pro-
vided that common law should control in federal question cases. 256
By leaving this black hole in the Federal Rules, Congress insulated
the federal law of privilege from the "plain meaning" control ex-
tended to most of the remainder of the Rules.257 Ironically, privi-
lege-the area which caused Congress the most concern, and
prevented Congress' wholesale adoption of the Rules-is now the
primary area in which the judiciary can assert independence and
contribute the most to the development of the law.2 58
The time has come to assess how the federal common law has
performed. Scholars have raised questions about individual privi-
lege decisions by the Supreme Court.259 In addition, scholars sug-
gest with great frequency new candidates for privileges, such as
accountants, parents, and children.260 It is important, however, to
track the development of the common law in all areas of privilege.
Overwhelming uniformity might indicate that codification is now
possible. Conversely, vast divergences in the federal common law
developed by the circuits would also demand attention from
rulemakers. There are many strong arguments for maintaining the
status quo, particularly if the federal common law mirrors state
law.2 6 1 Nevertheless, privileges remain an area ripe for study.
3. Rule 801: The Structure of Hearsay
Another area that deserves reconsideration is hearsay and its ex-
ceptions. The call for global hearsay reform is growing. An entire
issue of the Minnesota Law Review comprised of papers delivered at a
recent conference on the subject will soon appear.262 That volume
follows a number of important scholarly pieces dealing with the
subject. 263
At the very least, the structure of the Rules should be revisited.
256. Although we believe that application of federal statutory privilege rules in state
law diversity cases would be clearly constitutional, we also believe that it would be highly
undesirable in an area so interwoven with the state's interest in the status and relation-
ships of its citizens. Therefore, we believe that the Rule 501 command-that where
state law governs the rules of decision, state privileges should apply-should continue.
The more interesting and controversial question concerns the fate of the federal com-
mon law that has continued to develop since the enactment of the Federal Rules.
257. See supra part II.
258. See EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 112 (stating that "[i]ronically, Congress
enacted a rule and a statute that resulted in the Supreme Court's having as much, if not
more, control over privileges than it would have had if specific rules had been adopted
along with the remainder of the Rules").
259. See ROTHSTEIN, NuTSHELL, supra note 23, at 442 (criticizing Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)).
260. See id. at 454-61.
261. See EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 112-13 (discussing the benefits and
drawbacks of codification).
262. The symposium will be published at 76 MINN. L. REV. in the spring of 1992.
263. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay' Reform, 86 MIcH. L.
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The Rules' denomination of certain prior statements and admis-
sions as "non-hearsay" exemptions from (instead of exceptions to)
the hearsay rule is unnecessarily confusing.2r The reasoning be-
hind this taxonomy, which is only murkily understood by the bar,
derives from theories of agency and the adversary system.2 65 The
consequences of this logic are significant, however, because the
traditional requirement for a hearsay exception-circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness--does not apply to "non-hearsay." 266
Additionally, an Advisory Committee might examine the "struc-
ture" problem insofar as it permits the admission of prior consistent
statements as substantive (as opposed to merely rehabilitative) evi-
dence, a distinction that has produced much confusion, and even
division in the circuits, with apparently little benefit to the litigation
REV. 51 (1987); Eleanor Swift,A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1341
(1987).
264. Rule 801(d) defines prior statements and identifications by available witnesses
and various forms of admissions as "statements which are not hearsay." FED. R. EVID.
801(d); see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER
THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 183-89 (1988) (deriding the "statutory magic"
of labeling 801(d) not hearsay).
265. The touchstone of hearsay exclusion is lack of cross-examination. An agent's
statements legally operate as one's personal statements. Because a party cannot com-
plain that he missed the opportunity to cross-examine himself, the argument goes, a
party cannot complain because he missed the opportunity to cross-examine his agent or
coconspirator. To the extent the logic is compelling at all, it does not make sense for
the types of admissions most removed from the party against whom the admission is
admitted-admissions of agents and coconspirators.
266. See Bein, supra note 1, at 393 (questioning the fundamental structure of Rule
801, arguing that admissions should be subjected to a trustworthiness requirement, and
suggesting a redraft of 801(d)(2)). The title of Professor Bein's article emanates from
the case of Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th
Cir. 1978), which held admissible the (outcome determinative) statement by the Director
of Education of Wild Canid that Sophie, a "gentle wolf... bit a child." However, the
Director had not been present at the incident and it was questionable whether the child's
injury may have come not from a wolf bite but from the barbs on top of a fence that the
child may have climbed over to visit Sophie. The Director's statement, although highly
speculative and arguably quite unreliable, was admitted on an agency theory. Id. at 631.
Similarly, there is no overarching requirement of trustworthiness mandated under the
hearsay exceptions. Neither the text of Rule 801, nor the text of Rules 803 and 804,
which enumerate approved exceptions to the hearsay rule, articulate what the jurispru-
dence generally considers to be an incident to approved exceptions to the Rule-the
requirement of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Some exceptions do have
individual trustworthiness requirements. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 803(8), 803(24).
The lack of such a blanket trustworthiness requirement can lead to anomalies.
A case recently tried in the Northern District of Alabama, called to our attention by
Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer, suggests the desirability of adding a general trustworthy
proviso to Rule 802. Rule 803(16) excepts "[sitatements in a document in existence
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established." Counsel in the Alabama
case argued that, in the absence of an overarching trustworthiness requirement, a state-
ment in a twenty-year-old edition of a supermarket checkout-counter tabloid could come
into evidence as a statement in an ancient document. Although the specific point is not
of major import, it suggests a glitch of broader potential significance that would benefit
from attention.
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4. Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5): The Hearsay Residual Exceptions
Another area that we believe deserves close attention is the hear-
say residual or catch-all clause.2 68 Scholars and judges have formu-
lated theories as to appropriate use of the residual exception. At the
very least, the residual was designed for the odd case where clearly
trustworthy hearsay could be admitted although it did not fit within
a recognized exception. 269 There is debate as to how much more
open the residual exception should be.270
The operation of the hearsay residual exception sheds light on
hearsay doctrine and its development. Indeed, examining the use of
the residual exception is a good way of determining what is on the
cutting edge of hearsay admissibility and what types of reliable, but
technically excluded, hearsay are presented to the courts. The
residual exception thus can serve as a testing ground for developing
hearsay exceptions.
We are troubled, however, when courts commonly use the
residual exception to admit hearsay for which Congress explicitly
refused to provide an exception. This phenomenon is particularly
apparent with respect to prior inconsistent statements that fall
outside the scope of Rule 801(d) (1) (A), such as former grand jury
testimony where the witness is no longer available. 271 Rule
267. See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 905 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that prior
consistent statements can be admissible as substantive evidence, but acknowledging that
"the rule is confusing").
268. Although there are actually two residuals, Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b) (5), they
overlap and can be considered as one. Both residuals require that: (1) the statement
must be relevant (redundant of Rule 401); (2) the statement must have circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the trustworthiness of the enumerated ex-
ceptions in Rule 803 and Rule 804(b); (3) the statement must be more probative than
any other evidence the proponent can offer through reasonable efforts; (4) once admit-
ted, the statement must serve the interest ofjustice; and (5) the proponent of the state-
ment must provide pre-trial notice to the opposing party. The only significant
difference between Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) is that Rule 804 requires that the
declarant be unavailable. It is hard to imagine a case that could fall under Rule
804(b)(5) and yet not meet the identical requirements of Rule 803(24). Indeed, one
sensible suggestion for reform could be the reformulation of the two residuals into one
separate rule.
269. See, e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961) (holding proper reliance on a 20-year-old newspaper article to prove that a
fire had occurred; the ancient documents exception did not exist at this time).
270. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Scope of the Residual Exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1978) (advocating a more liberal construc-
tion of the exception); Myrna Raeder, The Effect of the Catchalls on Criminal Defendants:
Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and is Devoured, 25 Loy. L. REV. 1326 (to be
published in 1992) (arguing that the hearsay catch-all rule affects criminal defendants
disproportionately); David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay
Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982) (arguing for a
broadening of the residual hearsay exception); Raymond L. Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay:
The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 11 -TEx. TECH L. REV. 587 (1980) (arguing for a
liberalized construction of the residual hearsay exception).
271. See United States v. Marchini, 797 F.2d 759, 762-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
admissibility of prior grand jury testimony with adequate indicia of reliability did not
violate the Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987); United States v.
Walker, 696 F.2d 277, 280-81 (4th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983);
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801(d)(1)(A) requires that, before the hearsay may be used as sub-
stantive evidence, the declarant must be available for cross-examina-
tion. Resort to the catch-all exception eviscerates this important
safeguard. Once it becomes evident that the residual exception is
being used repeatedly to cover a certain type of hearsay, such as
out-of-court statements of child victims of sexual assault,272 an Advi-
sory Committee should consider either creating a new exception, or
labelling the evidence as inadmissible hearsay.
Another reason for our position disfavoring repeated use of the
residual exception is that the stare decisis effect of the residual ex-
ception is limited to the facts of individual cases. 273 Therefore, even
if repeated use of regular exceptions specifically rejected by the
Rules' drafters or by Congress constitutes an appropriate use of the
residual exception, it cannot substitute for amendments to the
Rules.
2 7 4
Conclusion: The Task for an Advisory Committee
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the time has come for
a thorough review and selective revision of the Federal Rules. Sig-
nificant conflicts, questions, and inconsistencies have developed in
the jurisprudence during the sixteen-year hegemony of the Rules.
We have focused primarily on three areas that need immediate at-
tention: the foundation requirements for coconspirator declara-
tions,275 the standard of admissibility for scientific evidence,276 and
the applicability of evidence rules in sentencing proceedings. 277 A
United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 960-65 (6th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1352-60 (8th
Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). But see United States v. Fernandez,
892 F.2d 976, 982 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding that prior grand jury testimony is inadmissi-
ble unless "extraordinarily trustworthy"); United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp 1499,
1506 (D.N.J. 1987) (same), a~d, 857 F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1988). See generally 4 WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 18, 803(24)[01], at 803-375 to 803-376 (discussing various ap-
proaches to the admissibility of former grand jury testimony where the witness is no
longer available); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual
Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Juty Testimony, 36
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 431 (1986) (analyzing judicial interpretations of the residual ex-
ceptions in cases considering the admissibility of grand jury testimony).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 609 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1068 (1988); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1441 (8th Cir. 1986).
273. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, 803(24)(01].
274. Concerns that individual judges may be circumventing established hearsay doc-
trine have led us to endorse the "near miss" rule, which holds that the residual excep-
tion does not apply in cases where the proffered evidence misses, just barely, inclusion
within another category of exception. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1262-64 (E.D. Pa. 1980), modified, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
But see Sonenshein, supra note 270, at 885-88 (finding the near miss theory "unhelpful").
275. See supra part II.
276. See supra part III.
277. See supra part IV.
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host of other candidates, however, invite review and possible revi-
sion. We have identified some of them in what we hope will serve as
a starting point toward discussion and reform.
We note preliminarily our view that certainty in the Federal Rules
is, in at least one significant respect, more important than certainty
in the rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure. During the crucible of
trial, when counsel and the court must make important decisions
without much time for reflection or research, they rarely need to
consult the Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure (except perhaps
with respect to motions for directed verdicts orjudgment of acquit-
tal). They must, however, constantly consult the Rules of Evi-
dence. 278 Accordingly, clarity and certainty in the Rules is critically
important. Implicated here is not only the goal of predictability, but
also the cost of relitigation. Careful revision will not undermine,
but, rather, enhance the certainty of the Rules, given the current
state of confusion surrounding many of them. An Advisory Com-
mittee is needed to rectify the problems that we have identified.
The Committee may accomplish its task not only by Rule revision
and clarification, but also by the monitoring and ancillary educa-
tional process that it might initiate.
An Advisory Committee would serve at least four functions. First,
and most important, it would review and continuously monitor the
Federal Rules. This reviewing process would involve decisions
ranging from specific details to global questions about evidence.
On a prosaic level, the Committee would clarify unintended ambi-
guities, correct subtle contradictions, and tidy-up small errors that
transcend mere technical problems but do not rise to the level of
policy debates. Identifying and reconciling conflicts and other small
errors is an obvious, but extremely important, function of our pro-
posed Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence. In some ways,
these smaller errors present the best reasons for gathering together
a Committee to review the Rules. Egregious problems or popular
concerns may eventually be addressed by Congress. Circuit splits
may some day attract the attention of the Supreme Court. However,
small contradictions, such as those affecting the rules ofjudicial no-
tice, 279 may go uncorrected. Similarly, an Advisory Committee, be-
cause of its focus and expertise, is the best vehicle for addressing
occasional poor drafting of the Rules.280
278. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Quality of Practice in
Federal Courts, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 173, 184-85 (1978) (discussing the need for rules of
evidence that are readily ascertainable during trial).
279. See supra notes 218-22, 232-37 and accompanying text.
280. For example, Professor Berger has criticized as "confusing" the drafting of
Rules 404, 608(b), and 613(b). See Berger, supra note 1, at 262-63 nn.37-38. Professor
Berger also has pointed out to us an interesting anomaly-a problem created as the
unintended consequence of the gender-neutralizing amendment process. Rule
804(b)(2), the dying declarations rule, formerly read:
Statement under belief of impending death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a
civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing
that his death was imminent, concerning the cause of circumstances of what
he believed to be his impending death [is not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness]
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In conducting its review, an Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules should pay particular attention to plain meaning. If it is dili-
gent in monitoring the Rules for clarity and consistency with actual
trial practice, deviations between plain meaning and the general ex-
pectations of the bench and bar are less likely to occur. We note
that occasionally the current Advisory Committee notes deviate
from plain meaning.281 Given the Supreme Court's plain meaning
approach, the status of such extra-rule advice is questionable.
The Supreme Court's method of interpreting the Federal Rules
has not been entirely consistent. To the extent that it has adhered
to a rigid plain meaning approach, its reading arguably assumes the
existence of a responsive rulemaking body. Indeed, a court that re-
lies upon plain meaning and eschews judicial lawmaking should wel-
come a body that monitors the clarity and precision of the Rules.
To the extent that the Supreme Court has engaged in more expan-
sive interpretation of the Rules, based upon public policy and con-
gressional intent, the guidance and responsiveness of a Committee
is essential.
A Committee's monitoring must also address circuit splits and
correct judicial excesses.2 82 It is particularly important to identify
questions upon which the circuits have diverged. Such divergence
undermines the uniformity and predictability of trials in federal
courts. Because the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari, 283 a
Committee will play an important role in resolving conflicts. More-
over, courts can fill gaps and resolve conflicts only when presented
with a case or controversy. A Committee would not be so limited.
Second, in addition to correcting mistakes and addressing
problems, a Committee should be in the forefront of debates on
important evidence issues. Use of expert testimony, the admission
of hearsay statements by children who were victims of sexual abuse,
FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(2), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. advisory committee's notes (1982)
(emphasis added). The amended rule simply deleted the "his" before "impending
death." FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2). In the situation where there are two victims of a crime,
and both die, the question may arise as to whether the statement of one victim concern-
ing the cause or circumstances of the killing can be considered with respect to the death
of the other victim. Under the original Advisory Committee Note, it seems clear that it
could not--"his" referred to "his own" death. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2), reprinted in 28
U.S.C. app. advisory committee's notes (1982). Now, under the plain meaning ap-
proach, see supra part I, "impending death" might be that of both victims. This is the kind
of problem that an Advisory Committee easily could correct.
281. See e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee's notes (including statements
relating to case preparation that are not in the language of the Rule on statements made
for medical diagnosis); FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's notes (including a
business duty rule on the business records hearsay exception that is not in the text of the
Rule itself).
282. See supra part V.
283. See, e.g., supra note 137 (noting the dissent ofJustices Blackmun and White from
the Supreme Court's denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari in Christophersen v.
Allied-Signal Corp.).
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applicability of the evidence rules to sentencing hearings-all de-
serve careful and organized attention from the bench and bar. This
role is particularly important now because proposals for revision of
the Civil Rules, designed to expedite the discovery and total litiga-
tion processes, are pending. 2 4
Third, an Advisory Committee should keep abreast of recent de-
velopments in scholarship and case law. It should also monitor pro-
fessional criticism, and serve as a clearinghouse for new proposals
from the academy, bench, and bar.28 5
Finally, even if the Committee determines that certain areas of the
Rules need not be revised, it should nevertheless provide assistance
in understanding the Rules. Because Congress enacted (rather than
adopted) the Federal Rules of Evidence, in the process making
many changes of its own, the Advisory Committee notes and the
accompanying House, Senate and Conference Reports are some-
times hard to follow. Occasionally, the Advisory Committee notes
do not reflect the final changes made in the Rules and refer to rules
that do not exist or that have been renumbered. More significant,
some of the notes are out of date. 28 6 In addition to updates and
clarifications in its notes, the Advisory Committee should incorpo-
rate more current case law interpreting and explaining the Federal
Rules.
Not all of the problems we have identified in this Article must be
dealt with by amendments to the Rules. Revisions to the Advisory
Committee notes can signal approval or disapproval of case law
trends. In addition, the Committee might sponsor, or request the
Federal Judicial Center to sponsor, a publication analogous to the
Manual for Complex Litigation that would give assistance to the bench
and bar in administering the Rules.2 7
The only remaining question might be why we propose an Advi-
sory Committee as opposed to some other mechanism. We firmly
believe that the monitoring and revision functions we have outlined
284. For example, the proposed amendment to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will make depositions automatically admissible at trial without the need to
show unavailability of the witness. See 60 U.S.L.W. 2158-59 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1991)
(describing the proposed change to Rule 32). Facilitating the introduction of deposition
testimony may be beneficial, but it has the net effect of depriving the factfinder of de-
meanor evidence. This trend underscores the need for an Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence to monitor the impact of changes in other rules on trial evidence.
285. See generally Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV.
849, 859-71 (1991) (discussing how doctrinal scholarship improves evidence law). In
discussing the nature of evidence scholarship, Professor Park muses why it has, com-
pared to civil procedure and other practice-oriented subjects, suffered from a malaise in
scholarship. In addition to the reasons Professor Park presents, we add another: the
lack of a responsible responsive Advisory Committee dampens interest in evidence
scholarship.
286. For example, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 201 cites the case of Haw-
kins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), as an example of a case that establishes a
legislative fact. Ironically, however, much of that case and the policy embodied in the
legislative fact has been reconsidered by the Supreme Court in Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
287. See FJC, REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-5 (discussing the idea of a formal manual on
evidence).
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can be accomplished properly only by an Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence operating under the aegis of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States.2 8  First, there is good evidence that
such a regime works. The models provided by the other Advisory
Committees-those for the Criminal, Civil, Appellate and Bank-
ruptcy Rules-validate this system of monitoring and proposing
changes in the various procedural rules.2 89
In addition, there is simply no other body that can do the work we
suggest. Certainly, none has confronted the task in the sixteen years
since the Rules emerged.2 90 Neither Congress nor the Courts (sans
Advisory Committee) possess sufficient institutional interest or
power to pursue the job. Congress is too busy to focus on day-to-
day monitoring. Its attention can be drawn by the headlines-such
as in the "Hinckley amendment to Rule 704," prohibiting expert
testimony on the ultimate issue of sanity. In less sensational cases, it
is very hard to capture Congress' attention and even harder to sus-
tain it through the long process of drafting and revision. In addi-
tion, the Federal Rules pertain to the operation of trials and
admission of evidence-areas outside the interest or expertise of the
legislative branch. Of course, Congress has the last "say" on the
Rules,29' but the proposal of amendments by an Advisory Commit-
tee would stimulate a dialogue between the judiciary and Congress
that is best effectuated through the rulemaking process.
The courts also face inherent limitations upon their ability to cor-
rect problems with the Federal Rules. First, they are increasingly
limited by plain meaning analysis, resulting in their having to acqui-
esce to poor drafting. Although the courts possess the power to
288. As we have explained, see supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text, assignment of
the responsibility for the Federal Rules of Evidence to the Advisory Committee on Civil
or Criminal Rules is problematic, and the Standing Committee would not appear to have
the time to handle the task. A recent letter addressed to ChiefJustice William Rehnquist
and the Chairs of the Standing Committee, the Criminal Rules Committee, and the Civil
Rules Committee, signed by over 75 law professors, expressed "disappointment over
the lack of focus on particular problems of evidence in the procedure for amending the
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and of Evidence." Letter from Law
Professors to ChiefJustice William Rehnquist and the Chairs of the Standing Commit-
tee, Criminal Rules Committee, and Civil Rules Committee 1 (Feb. 11, 1992) (copy on
file with The George Washington Law Review). The letter urged "specialized scrutiny" of
amendments to the Civil and Criminal Rules for their effect on the Rules of Evidence.
Id. The letter proposed as one possible solution to this lack of coordination and over-
sight the "reconstitution of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence." Id
289. Another analogy might be to the United States Sentencing Commission, which
is charged with ongoing review of cases construing the Sentencing Guidelines so as to
be in a position to refine the Guidelines on a continuing basis. See supra note 151. In
view of the role of the Supreme Court's plain meaning jurisprudence in the dialogue,
this type of review is best performed by an agency within the judicial branch.
290. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988).
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interpret the Federal Rules and create federal common law sur-
rounding ambiguous terms, those interpretations are not always
uniform, and circuit splits fester. Finally, courts are limited because
they must decide case and controversies, not abstract legal issues.
Concrete problems do not always present the issues in the best
form; courts do not always have access to experts, and their ability
to find facts generally is restricted by the positions of the parties in
the cases before them.
By contrast, an administrative body such as the Advisory Commit-
tee we propose would have the resources, time, and interest to mon-
itor the Rules and propose changes. Objections that an Advisory
Committee is somehow undemocratic are untenable. Of all the pos-
sible sources, an Advisory Committee is likely to reflect the most
diversity. The Advisory Committee is also the forum most likely to
be responsive to other disciplines. 292 Law has much to learn from
the social sciences-the Rules of Evidence would benefit from the
knowledge acquired in psychology, for example 29 3-but we need an
attentive body with a mission in order to respond to outside ideas.
That mission should not be of wholesale change for change's sake,
but, rather, the kind of responsible monitoring and selective revi-
sion suggested in this Article.
We recognize that it is easier to identify problems than to correct
them. We have no illusions about the enormity of the task we have
described. But the Rules need careful attention, and an Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence is essential to fulfill the statu-
tory mandate. For that reason, we suggest the need for a new Com-
mittee, and rescribe the ancient homily: "The day is short, the work
is great, the reward is much, and our Master is insistent." 294
292. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions
Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 155 (1991) (compar-
ing developments in jury instructions emerging from courts, legislatures, and adminis-
trative bodies and concluding that the administrative bodies were most likely to learn
from other disciplines).
293. See Park, supra note 285, at 849-51 (discussing why evidence does not seem to
learn from other disciplines).
294. ETHIcs OF THE FATHERS 2:20 (statement of Rabbi Tarfon).
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